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A PRUSSIAN OBSERVER WITH LEE

BY JAY LUVAAAS*

IN February, 1863, a young Prussian officer of Engineers was summoned to Berlin by Prince von Radziwill, Chief of the Corps of Engineers, and informed that he was being sent to America as a military observer. The Prussian General Staff desired specific data regarding "the effect of rifled artillery against earth, masonry, and iron." After conferring with von Prittwitz, Deputy Inspector-General of Fortifications, and von Roon, the War Minister, Captain Justus Scheibert departed on his mission.¹

Scheibert was well suited for this task. Possessing the desired social attributes,² he was observant, intelligent, and known to be interested in his profession. He was also a capable writer. Early in his career he had attracted the attention of Colonel von Voigts-Rhetz, who later attained a position of considerable influence in the Prussian Army,³ by his habit of spending his annual leave studying army maneuvers and by the pertinent observations of these which he recorded

in his diary. Others, including several of the General Staff, were impressed by the articles he had contributed to the *Illustrierten Zeitung* on the campaign of 1859 in Italy.⁴ He was probably best known, however, for the pamphlet he wrote in 1861 on the influence of rifled artillery on fortress warfare.⁵ This was a timely and important subject, and Scheibert soon acquired a reputation as an authority on modern fortifications.⁶ Whatever else may have influenced the Prussian authorities in their decision to send Scheibert to America as a military observer, his reputation in this field undoubtedly made him appear a logical choice for the assignment.

Scheibert reached New York the first week of March, 1863. Originally he was to accompany the Union Army, but because he wished to examine the effects of modern artillery fire on the defenses at Charleston and was at heart a strong Southern sympathizer,⁷ he persuaded his superiors to allow him to visit

*The author, formerly director of the Flowers Collection, Duke University Library, Durham, N. C., recently joined the Dept. of History, Allegheny College, Meadville, Pa. He previously contributed "G. F. R. Henderson and the American Civil War," *Military Affairs*, XX, 139-153.

¹Justus Scheibert, *Mit Schwert und Feder. Erinnerungen aus meinem Leben* (Berlin, 1902), pp. 35-36.

²A clue to Scheibert's personality is found in Lieut.-Col. W. W. Blackford, *War Years with Jeb Stuart* (New York, 1946), pp. 203, 206-209. Scheibert's autobiography suggests that he was sociable and met people well. See *Mit Schwert und Feder*, pp. 24-25.

³*Ibid.*, pp. 15-16. Generalmajor Konstantin Bernhard von Voigts-Rhetz was named Director of the General War Department in the War Ministry in 1859. He later became a prominent staff officer in the campaigns of 1866 and 1870-71. *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie* (Leipzig, 1896), XL, 216-220.

⁴These articles were published anonymously, but Scheibert was soon identified as the author.

⁵Justus Scheibert, *Einfluss der neuesten Taktik und der gezogenen Waffen auf den Festungskrieg. Mit benutzen der vor Sebastopol gemachten Erfahrungen* (Berlin, 1861).

⁶*Mit Schwert und Feder*, pp. 22-23, 29-30.

⁷Most officers in the Prussian Army seem to have been sympathetic to the South. Those who served in the Union Army were emigrants, many of them liberals who had been forced to flee Germany in 1848. The Prussian officer corps, composed mostly of nobles, seemed to resent the democratic flavor of the large German element in the Union Army. See Julius von Wickede, *Ein deutscher Landsknecht der neuesten Zeit . . .* (Jena und Leipzig, 1864), III, 114-115. The fact that this book is largely a work of fiction does not detract from the writer's prejudice in this regard. A popular military writer, von Wickede probably voiced the majority sentiment in the Prussian Army at this time.

the Confederate Army in an "unofficial capacity." (For diplomatic reasons, since the Confederacy was not recognized by the European powers, the Prussian government chose not to order him south.⁸)

After a brief stay in New York, where he saw enough of the Union Army to form a lasting prejudice against it,⁹ Scheibert sailed to Nassau and boarded a blockade runner bound for Charleston. He was charmed by this city of the Old South, but since there were no active military operations in progress there at the time, he proceeded to Richmond. There he met with several high-ranking officials of the Confederacy and was guided over the outlying fortifications and battlegrounds. Scheibert hoped eventually to reach the Confederate forces in the West, but first he planned a brief visit to the Army of Northern Virginia, then intrenched on the heights above Fredericksburg.

Arriving at Fredericksburg in April, Scheibert spent a busy week with the army of Robert E. Lee before he met Heros von Borcke, a former Prussian officer then serving on the staff of General J. E. B. Stuart.¹⁰ Von Borcke persuaded Scheibert to join Stuart's cavalry in camp at Culpeper. He remained with Stuart until May, when, mindful of his primary purpose in visiting the Confederacy, he set out to observe the *Festungskrieg* at Vicksburg. A sudden illness and word that Vicksburg had been completely cut off by Union forces under General U. S. Grant caused Scheibert to abandon this enterprise and return to the Army of Northern Vir-

ginia. He accompanied Lee's staff on the Gettysburg campaign. Following the retreat from Pennsylvania he returned to Charleston, which was then besieged by Union naval and land forces. As soon as he had seen "what was valuable for the Prussian Army," Scheibert journeyed north to Wilmington. After a tour of the works there he departed for Bermuda and Europe.

An eye-witness of fourteen battles and engagements, Scheibert by this time knew the Confederate Army well. He had served as a sort of handyman (*Rittmeister* was the title he preferred) on Stuart's staff, preparing maps, translating letters captured from German-born soldiers, carrying messages, and occasionally even helping in the construction of bridges and breastworks. He had come under fire for the first time in his life at Chancellorsville, had participated in the cavalry battle at Brandy Station, and had viewed Gettysburg from a tall oak overlooking Lee's field headquarters. He was familiar with the rank and file and had observed and conversed with Lee, Stuart, and Stonewall Jackson during anxious moments in battle. He had many personal friends among the junior officers, from whom he had gained much knowledge about campaigns and incidents at which he had not been present. At Charleston he had been given access to confidential information. Like most foreign officers who came to know the Army of Northern Virginia, Scheibert departed for Europe a full-fledged Confederate.¹¹

Upon his return to Prussia, Scheibert submitted a detailed report of his findings, discussed his views with various military leaders (among them Prince Frederick Karl and Field Marshal von Wrangel), and lectured before military organizations about his experiences. He was an active participant in the campaigns of 1864, 1866, and 1870, where

⁸*Mit Schwert und Feder*, pp. 35-36.

⁹Like most professional soldiers, Scheibert was unimpressed by the drill of the Northern recruits. Many of the English military observers of the Civil War reacted similarly. See Jay Luvaas, "Through Foreign Eyes: The American Civil War in European Military Thought" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Duke University, 1956), pp. 17-18, 26-30.

¹⁰Von Borcke's experiences are related in Heros von Borcke, *Memoirs of the Confederate War for Independence* (2 vols.; reprinted New York, 1938).

¹¹*Mit Schwert und Feder*, pp. 45-167 *passim*.

he was wounded at the battle of Wörth. In 1868 he wrote a popular account of his trip entitled *Sieben Monate in den Rebellen Staaten*.¹² Six years later, while stationed at Minden, he prepared a more detailed and technical book on his observations. By this time he was well-known for his Civil War experiences (according to Scheibert, Prince Bismarck requested his services as guide through the captured Danish works at Düppel because of his reputation acquired in America¹³) and could evaluate them in the light of more recent campaigns.

*Der Bürgerkrieg in den nordamerikanischen Staaten*¹⁴ is a critical analysis of the military aspects of the Civil War. Commencing with a précis of the military operations, he wrote in considerable detail of the organization, equipment, and tactics of the three arms, and of the engineer, navy, and sanitary services as well. He devoted a special section to the strategy of the war and even included biographical sketches of the foremost generals on both sides. Because of the controversial nature of the subject, his most interesting observations are those concerning the development of Civil War tactics.

The tactics of infantry posed special problems. Scheibert's own experience with infantry in America had been limited (most

of the time he had been with the cavalry or else observing siege operations at Charleston), and he found the printed sources confusing and often contradictory. He noted the French influence in the training of both armies: Hardee's *Rifle and Light Infantry Tactics* and Casey's *Infantry Tactics*, which served as the official manuals for the Confederate and Union armies respectively, were based upon the French regulations. The Confederates had "acquired great skill," Scheibert thought, in mastering their formations and could form in line of battle "in an incredibly short time." But he also stressed the fact that in combat both armies failed to adhere to the peacetime regulations (which frequently is the case) and that from the chaos and confusion of the initial campaigns there emerged a new system of infantry tactics "which merits examination in its different phases."¹⁵

The first phase, according to Scheibert, was characterized by isolated and disjointed combats, with neither army being sufficiently trained or organized to sustain a major offensive drive. Like the British observer, Fletcher, Scheibert detected a tendency, especially on the part of the Union troops, to waste ammunition in useless skirmishing at excessive distances.¹⁶ The Confederates, with inferior weapons, are represented as showing a preference for fighting at close quarters. This period, culminating in the first battle of Bull Run, was one of improvised tactics, inadequate discipline, and uneven leadership. It was the undignified performance of both

¹²Scheibert, *Sieben Monate in den Rebellen Staaten während des nordamerikanischen Krieges* (Stettin, 1868). The bulk of this work is contained in *Mit Schwert und Feder*. It is significant that in 1868 Scheibert did not mention specifically what he had been sent to America to observe.

¹³*Mit Schwert und Feder*, p. 228.

¹⁴Scheibert, *Der Bürgerkrieg in den nordamerikanischen Staaten. Militärisch beleuchtet für den deutsche Offizier* (Berlin, 1874). All citations to this work refer to the French edition, *La guerre civile aux Etats Unis d'Amérique considérée au point de vue militaire pour les officiers de l'armée allemande* (Paris, 1876). Although Scheibert mentioned an English translation (*Mit Schwert und Feder*, p. 300) and the late Douglas Southhall Freeman stated that this volume was "available" in English translation (*Lee's Lieutenants* [New York, 1944], III, 824), no American or English edition of *Der Bürgerkrieg* can be located nor is it listed in any of the standard bibliographical works.

¹⁵*Mit Schwert und Feder*, p. 67; *La guerre civile*, pp. 37-45, 49-50.

¹⁶Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Charles Fletcher, Scots Fusilier Guards, visited both the Union and Confederate armies in 1862. Writing about the Union soldiers during the Peninsular campaign, Fletcher commented: "Like all young and undisciplined troops, the men were fond of using their rifles but careful not to expose themselves." Therefore "much powder was wasted at long ranges" and "little harm was done." *History of the American War* (London, 1865), I, 84-87.

armies at Bull Run which, in Scheibert's opinion, had caused many European soldiers to lose interest in the American campaigns.¹⁷

The second phase (1862-1863) saw the gradual emergence of linear tactics. By this time both armies had improved substantially in organization, training, and discipline. They had ceased to mass troops on the battlefield because of the growing effectiveness of artillery fire, and now deployed in two and sometimes three lines, with skirmishers a hundred feet or so in advance. Usually these lines merged into one confused mass as the battle progressed. Fremantle, an English officer whom Scheibert met at Gettysburg, had noted that the Civil War armies tended to outreach the immediate control of the field commander;¹⁸ Scheibert observed this same tendency. He once discussed the problem with Lee and was told: "I do my duty insofar as my powers and capabilities will permit, until the moment when battle begins: I then leave the matter to God and the . . . subordinate officers. . . ."¹⁹ Scheibert described this second phase as a period when the Confederates generally took the strategic initiative and

acted on the tactical offensive in most battles.²⁰

The third, and to Scheibert the most interesting phase in the evolution of Civil War infantry tactics, was that of the tactical defensive (1863-1865). This was the period of the spade and axe, when field fortifications ruled the battlefield. Intrenchments, it is true, had been used before in the war—Scheibert himself had seen them on his tour of the battlefields near Richmond and in the fighting at Chancellorsville—but never on so large a scale. Scheibert attributed this development to several factors: It was partially the result of the lack of tactical unity and centralized command that had characterized previous battles, but it was due even more to the fact that after Gettysburg Lee faced overwhelming numbers and had no choice but to resort to the tactical defensive.

In this period, the least known of the Civil War, General Lee . . . employed all of his talents as general and tactician, talents which, brought to their complete development by three years of experience and extensive study, [and] supported by experienced troops, produced brilliant results.²¹

Scheibert did not advocate the extensive use of intrenchments. He preferred, whenever possible, an offensive in the open field. But in 1864 Lee's forces had not been strong enough to undertake a major offensive against Grant, and Scheibert was forced to admit that in this campaign "the superiority of . . . [defensive] tactics over all other means of fighting was demonstrated to the point that all attempts made to employ different tactics failed completely."²²

²⁰*Ibid.*, pp. 59-68.

²¹*Ibid.*, p. 75. It is generally agreed that Lee was at his best during the 1864 campaign against Grant. See Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice, *Robert E. Lee the Soldier* (Boston, 1925), pp. 217 ff; Douglas Southall Freeman, *Robert E. Lee* (New York, 1936), III, 447.

²²*La guerre civile*, p. 85; "General Lee," *Jahrbücher*, XVI, 105-106, 306-307.

¹⁷*La guerre civile*, pp. 4, 51-54, 59.

¹⁸Lieutenant-Colonel James Arthur Lyon Fremantle, of Her Majesty's Coldstream Guards, commented that insofar as he could determine, Lee at Gettysburg "during the whole time the firing continued . . . only sent one message and only received one report." It is evidently his system, Fremantle concluded, "to arrange the plan thoroughly with the three corps commanders, and then leave to them the duty of modifying and carrying it out. . . ." *Three Months in the Southern States* (New York, 1864), p. 260.

¹⁹Scheibert, "General Robert E. Lee, Ober-Commandeur der ehemaligen Südstaatlichen Armee in Nord-Amerika," *Jahrbücher für die Deutsche Armee und Marine*, XVI (September, 1875), 208-209. Cited hereafter as Scheibert, "General Lee," *Jahrbücher*. A slightly different version, due perhaps to the difficulties in translation, is given in *La guerre civile*, pp. 66-67. Here Lee is quoted as saying: ". . . my supervision during the battle does more harm than good. It would be unfortunate if . . . I could not rely upon my division and brigade commanders. I think and work with all my powers to bring my troops to the right place at the right time; then I have done my duty. Once I have thrown the troops into battle, I entrust the care of my army to the hands of God."

With regard to the tactics of the Civil War cavalry, Scheibert was in basic agreement with von Borcke.²³ He, too, claimed that the Union cavalry was actually mounted infantry which fought for the most part dismounted, whereas the Confederates had extolled the traditional mounted charge whenever practicable. Both rated the Confederate cavalry superior to the Union cavalry in quality, spirit, and leadership, attributing the success of the latter in 1864-1865 to the Northern superiority in numbers. Scheibert steadfastly maintained that shock tactics (the mounted charge with lance or saber) remained the "fundamental principle of cavalry combat." He recognized the need for occasional dismounted fighting in dense woods and rough terrain, but warned that too great a reliance upon firearms would lower the over-all efficiency of the arm and damage the so-called "cavalry spirit." He doubted whether mounted infantry, as opposed to cavalry proper, could operate as effectively in the open fields of Europe as it had in Virginia.²⁴

Nevertheless, Scheibert professed wonder "at the great role which cavalry had played in the Civil War, particularly when the terrain was as unfavorable as possible for great developments." Recent campaigns in the Crimea (1854-1856)—where the famous and futile "charge of the Light Brigade" had

occurred—and in Italy (1859) had convinced many that the heyday of cavalry had passed, and that henceforth the infantryman would be the most effective soldier. The Civil War encouraged Scheibert to think otherwise. The Confederates had combined shock tactics and dismounted fighting to a remarkable degree, and had used cavalry as a virtually independent arm. Stuart's men had illustrated the indispensable value of modern cavalry in reconnaissance and screening the army's movements, while at the same time they had lost none of "the true cavalry spirit." Scheibert did question, however, the value of the strategic cavalry raid. He believed that the results of the raids of Stuart, Nathan Bedford Forrest, and John H. Morgan had been exaggerated. Even when executed against untrained troops and armies dependent upon supply depots, in a country with few railroads and an inadequate telegraph system, where thick forests could mask the movements of entire armies—even under these ideal conditions the Civil War cavalry raids had had only limited success. In Europe, where such favorable conditions did not exist, such raids were bound to be still less effective.²⁵

Scheibert's most fruitful remarks were those concerning Civil War artillery and fortifications, for this is what he had been sent specifically to observe. His comments are all the more interesting because artillery in 1863 was in a period of transition. Rifled artillery was used in both armies, but it had not replaced entirely the old smoothbore and the merits of each type was a matter of controversy. According to Scheibert, Union artillerymen preferred the rifled gun, even though they employed the smoothbore "admirably."²⁶ Lee, on the other hand, is quoted

²³For von Borcke's views on Civil War cavalry, see *Memoirs of the Confederate War*, I, 55, 114; II, 107, 111. Von Borcke later became increasingly critical of the Civil War type cavalry, or mounted infantry, as opposed to the regular shock-action cavalry in Europe. Correspondence from von Borcke to an English officer of cavalry is quoted in Charles Sydney Goldman, "Cavalry: Its True Functions in Modern War," *The Cavalry Journal*, I (January, 1906), 76-77; Captain W. H. James, *The Role of Cavalry As Affected by Modern Arms of Precision* (Aldershot, 1894), pp. 7-8. Scheibert and von Borcke were joint authors of a work entitled *Die Grosse Reiterschlacht bei Brandy Station* (Berlin, 1893), in which their views appear harmonious.

²⁴*La guerre civile*, pp. 94-95, 100-103, 121; "General J. E. B. Stuart," *Jahrbücher*, XXV (December, 1877), 289, 297-298 (cited hereafter as Scheibert, "Stuart," *Jahrbücher*).

²⁵*Ibid.*, p. 265; *Mit Schwert und Feder*, p. 74; *La guerre civile*, p. 93, 121-123, 129; "General J. E. B. Stuart's . . . Raid," *Jahrbücher*, XXXIII (October, 1879), 164.

by Scheibert as saying that under certain conditions, particularly where the terrain is heavily wooded,

... nothing surpasses the impression produced by a battery of 12 pound smoothbores which has approached to within 400 to 600 feet of the enemy and functions not only by the action of its shell and grape shot, but also by the moral effect of its presence. In such moments rifled artillery, the advantages of which in open country I fully appreciate, cannot replace the smoothbore. That is why I have decided to maintain in my artillery an equal number of both.²⁷

Scheibert detected little fundamental difference in the Union and Confederate field artillery, except that the latter was used more to fire upon the enemy's troops than to silence his guns.²⁸ In both armies the trend was toward greater centralization, but rarely was artillery used in great masses. Chancellorsville and Gettysburg were the exceptions,

²⁶Major-General Henry J. Hunt, Chief of Artillery, Army of the Potomac, states: "There was amongst the younger officers a demand for the rifle-gun as the latest improvement, and it was urged by the Ordnance Department to the exclusion of smooth bores, but General McClellan wisely took the opinion of the older artillery officers, and directed that one-third the batteries should be of light 12-pounders [smooth bore]. These grew in favor and at the end of the war constituted half the field artillery. . . . Several of these Napoleon batteries were equipped as horse artillery because of their superiority, at close range, to the rifled-gun, and they answered the purpose perfectly." "Artillery," *Papers of the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts*, XIII (Boston, 1913), 115. This publication is cited hereafter as *M. H. S. P.*

²⁷*La guerre civile*, p. 134; *Mit Schwert und Feder*, p. 62. On December 5, 1862, Lee wrote the Secretary of War urging the manufacture of more 12-pounder Napoleons. "The best material for field service in his opinion were 12-pounder Napoleons, 10-pounder Parrotts [rifled], and the improved 2-inch rifles." In June, 1863, the artillery of the Army of Northern Virginia comprised one hundred and three 3-inch rifles, one hundred and seven 12-pounder Napoleons, thirty 12-pounder howitzers, and four 6-inch Whitworths [rifled]. Jennings Cropper Wise, *The Long Arm of Lee or the History of the Artillery of the Army of Northern Virginia* (Lynchburg, Virginia, 1915), I, 340; II, 571.

²⁸According to Wise, the authority on Lee's artillery, the Confederates used their artillery primarily as an anti-personnel weapon in many battles, among them Antietam, Fredericksburg, and the Wilderness. *Ibid.*, I, 324; 372; II, 832-833.

and in the case of the latter the artillery barrage preceding Pickett's charge was, in Scheibert's opinion, "a grandiose military spectacle but entirely without consequence on the issue of the battle."²⁹ He rated the Union artillery especially high and commented on the accuracy of its indirect fire. He could testify to this from personal experience.³⁰

Scheibert was particularly impressed by the new rifled siege artillery. The range and accuracy of the Union siege guns convinced him that the day of brick and mortar fortifications had passed. Henceforth earth-constructed forts, particularly those equipped with bomb shelters of the type used by the Confederates at Battery Wagner, would provide the best defense against modern artillery. Scheibert deemed it significant that at Charleston the attacking force, "despite the use of the very latest technical means"—iron-plated ships and rifled siege guns—did not "succeed in taking the fortifications by means of a siege." (Charleston did not actually fall until threatened in the rear by Sherman's army in 1865.) Scheibert further concluded that ironclads had played "only a secondary role" against land defenses, and that the torpedo, or submarine mine, actually was a greater threat to the enemy's morale than to his ships.³¹

In 1889 Lord Wolseley, who, as a relatively young officer, had visited Lee and Jackson in 1862, asserted that the "cooperating action of the naval and military services" constituted one of the "most important lessons" of the Civil War.³² Scheibert, too, was interested in this problem and in fact anticipated Wolseley by two years in his study of

²⁹*La guerre civile*, p. 139.

³⁰*Ibid.*, pp. 130-140.

³¹*Ibid.*, pp. 152-167; *Sieben Monate in den rebellen Staaten*, pp. 109-112; *Mit Schwert und Feder*, pp. 158-161.

³²"An English View of the Civil War," *The North American Review*, CXLIX (November, 1889), 597.

this particular phase of the war. In *Das Zusammenwirken der Armee und Marine*, published in 1887, Scheibert analyzed the operations of the Union Army and Navy along the Mississippi. The 1880's were years of increasing agitation within Germany for a more aggressive colonial policy: The Colonial Society, formed in 1882, and the *Kolonialzeitung*, founded two years later, were effective organs for what has been described as a "great outburst of imperialism." Sooner or later, Scheibert reasoned, local wars on distant continents would become unavoidable; there might even be occasion for combined operations along some of the rivers flowing into the North Sea and the Baltic.³³

Scheibert's study of the Mississippi River campaigns confirmed an observation he had made earlier at Charleston: Naval power alone could not overcome land fortifications. This was evident at Island Number 10 and "in all battles . . . from Fort Henry to the Grand Gulf. . . ." A fleet, "despite its mobility and clear superiority in both the calibre and quality . . . of its guns, was not equal to land batteries if unsupported . . . by land forces." Decisive results were possible only through combined naval and military operations. In addition to furnishing valuable tactical support, the Union Navy had also enabled the army to solve formidable problems in logistics. The gunboats had been indispensable in transporting troops and supplies, thus giving the army far greater mobility than otherwise would have been possible. In the light of Germany's new interest in naval and colonial affairs, Scheibert considered the military lessons of this campaign still valid.³⁴

³³Scheibert, *Das Zusammenwirken der Armee und Marine. Eine Studie illustriert durch das Kampf um den Mississippi 1861-65* (Rathenow, [1887]), pp. 2, 62. For a survey of the colonial movement in Germany see William L. Langer, *European Alliances and Alignments 1871-1890* (2d ed.; New York, 1950), pp. 88 ff.

³⁴*Das Zusammenwirken der Armee und Marine*, pp. 3-4, 8, 17, 23, 30, 64.

Scheibert believed that there was still another area in which the military lessons of the Civil War could be instructive. The introduction of long-range guns and the experiences of the war of 1870-1871 had resulted in much confusion of ideas regarding the future of fortification. Scheibert participated in this *Festungskrieg* controversy, in which he opposed the theories of Brialmont³⁵ and his enthusiastic followers. Brialmont advocated an elaborate network of barrier forts, fortified cities, and intrenched camps. He regarded the modern fort as a land battleship; sprinkled with many dome-like gun turrets called cupolas, these detached strongholds were designed to guard strategic points even to the point of resisting a determined siege.³⁶ Scheibert, on the other hand, contended that such a dependence upon fortifications would result in a defensive attitude and deprive a commander of the troops of the freedom of action needed to win victory in the field. The fortress, he argued, had outlived its usefulness as a supply depot. Detached forts could usually be by-passed like most natural obstacles, and at best would delay only a portion of the invading army corresponding to the size of the garrison. It was one thing for a small nation like Belgium to cover her boundaries with permanent works of the type suggested by Brialmont (although, as Scheibert pointed out, the Danish fortifications had failed to contain the Austro-Prussian forces in 1864), and

³⁵General Henri Brialmont, Belgian general and military engineer, was the creator of the fortresses of Antwerp, Liège, and Namur, made famous by the German invasion of Belgium in 1914.

³⁶According to an English contemporary, Brialmont "practically contents himself with sprinkling cupolas over his plans, and retains all the objectionable features of the stereotyped fort . . . tricks of drawing office fortification in its most aggravated form." Major G. Sydenham Clarke, *Fortification: Its Past Achievements, Recent Development, and Future Progress* (London, 1890), pp. 91-92. Brialmont's theories are also summarized in Lieutenant-Colonel Louis Charles Jackson, "Fortification and Siegecraft," *Encyclopedia Britannica* (11th ed.; Cambridge, 1910), X, 679-725.

quite another for Germany, with potential enemies on two lengthy fronts, to rely upon a system of fortification for protection against invasion. Scheibert also opposed the idea of intrenched camps, claiming that these would make it easy for a field army to seek refuge behind walls: The experiences of the French at Metz and Sedan in 1870 convinced him that this was a real danger.

In place of Brialmont's elaborate fortification system, Scheibert urged that the field army be considered the first line of defense, to be supported by isolated or improvised works whenever needed. Here Scheibert's views can be traced directly to his experiences during the Civil War. From Lee he had learned the value of field fortifications as a temporary defensive measure: The strength of the Confederate lines at Falling Waters on the retreat from Gettysburg evidently had made a lasting impression upon him.³⁷ At the same time, Scheibert remained convinced that only offensive action won wars. Lee, despite inferior numbers, had been a threat only as long as his army remained mobile; once confined to the trenches at Richmond and Petersburg, the end was merely a question of time. And in the West, where the Confederates had suffered a series of reverses because of what Scheibert described as a defensive attitude, an entire field army was lost at Vicksburg because it became tied to its fortifications. On the other hand, Sherman's campaigns demonstrated the value of maneuver. The Confederates had had to

evacuate their defenses both at Savannah and at Charleston to avoid being isolated by Sherman's northward march through the Carolinas. In each case, fortifications had been rendered useless by the mobility of Sherman's army. This is doubtless one reason why Scheibert preferred field fortifications—but only when necessary—to Brialmont's girdle of fortresses and entrenched camps.³⁸

Scheibert resigned from the army in 1876 and took up writing as a career. He felt cramped and frustrated in the Engineer Corps, where the prospects for promotion were discouraging and his theories on fortification were unpopular.³⁹ He soon made a name for himself as military correspondent for the politically conservative *Kreuzzeitung* and as a writer on a wide range of military subjects. In the twilight of his career Count von Waldersee, then Chief of the General Staff, brought him out of quasi-retirement to write on behalf of that organization. As one of the so-called "Press Hussars," Scheibert used his pen vigorously in a vain effort to prevent the reduction of the standard

³⁸Scheibert's main technical work, *Die Befestigungskunst und die Lehre vom Kampfe* (3 vols.; Berlin 1880-1886) cannot be located in this country. The views therein are summarized in General Pierron, *Stratégie et grande tactique d'après l'expérience des dernières guerres* (Paris, 1892), III, 425-426, and in two articles by Scheibert: "Strategische Streifflichter auf die Festungsfragen," *Beilage zum Militär-Wochenblatt* (1891), pp. 49-66; "Allerei Gedanken und Bedenken über den Festungsbau und Festungskrieg," *ibid.* (1902), pp. 215-236.

³⁹Although in the minority, Scheibert was not alone in his views on fortification. Generals von Scherff and von Sauer (who was later converted to Brialmont's theories) both raised similar arguments against the Brialmont school. *Mit Schwert und Feder*, pp. 315-316. Later Colmar von der Goltz, with whom Scheibert had once collaborated on a technical study of the *Festungskrieg* (*ibid.*, p. 300) espoused the theories of von Sauer and Major Max Schumann, both of whom advocated a more limited and flexible system of fortification than that proposed by Brialmont. *Freiherr von der Goltz und Wolfgang Foerster, editors, Generalfeldmarschall Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz Denkwürdigkeiten* (Berlin, 1929), p. 195. See also Pierron, *Stratégie et grande tactique*, III, 421-436. Like Scheibert, von der Goltz believed that the value of the fortress as a base had diminished appreciably, that

³⁷Brialmont, too, was aware of the value of field fortifications. In his treatise *Hasty Entrenchments* (London, 1872), he gave lip service to this lesson of the Civil War, stating that "never have hasty entrenchments been used with greater success, or more generally, than in the last war in America" (p. 127). Yet it is important to note that Brialmont throughout his book devoted more attention to the wars of Frederick the Great, Condé, and Turenne than to the American campaigns, and in a key chapter entitled "Instances of Fortified Fields of Battle" there is no mention of a single Civil War battle! His examples were taken from the wars of Napoleon or earlier.

term of military service in the German Army from three years to two.⁴⁰

After his retirement from the army Scheibert became a prolific writer on Civil War subjects, mainly, as he readily admitted, "to pay the rent." (This motive is not absent in the current flood of Civil War literature.) With few exceptions, his later writings on the Civil War are thin stuff. They lack substance and tend to be sentimental. Indeed, many of the articles which appear under his name were not written by him at all, but were merely translated from American publications. Scheibert published literally dozens of articles and reports written by Civil War soldiers. Often these were not even pure translations, but were "mixed up by remarks" based upon Scheibert's own experiences.⁴¹

As an historian, Scheibert was partial to the South and often inaccurate. Except for his study of the campaigns in the Mississippi Valley he manifested little interest in the war in the West; like most European soldiers, he attached undue significance to the Virginia campaigns. He seems to have had an adequate knowledge of the printed

fortresses tended to "anchor" large numbers of men in garrisons, and that "an extension of fortificatory works is due to a feeling of weakness. A nation in which a spirit of offensive action dwells will be moderate in their use. He who seeks his safety behind walls and ditches, lacks a sense of strength. More and more will he confine himself to passive resistance, the end of which . . . is sure defeat, be it ever so much delayed." Von der Goltz, *The Nation in Arms* (London, 1887), pp. 339-349 *passim*.

⁴⁰Mit *Schwert und Feder*, pp. 312-317, 332-336; Walter Goerlitz, *History of the German General Staff 1657-1945* (New York, 1953), pp. 109-114; Heinrich Otto Meisner, *Denkwürdigkeiten des General Feldmarschalls Alfred Grafen von Waldersee* (Stuttgart and Berlin, 1925), I, 374; II, 191-192, 272.

⁴¹"You will receive," Scheibert wrote a noted Civil War collector, "with the present mail . . . 'Stonewall Jackson's Virginienthal Feldzug' [published in *Jahrbücher*, XXI (1879), 204-216, 313-328]. I regret very much that you will not find any news in this little study, because it is a mere translation from Col. [William] Allen's lectures in the [*Southern Historical Society Papers*] only mixed up by remarks which I have given from my personal observations, and some hints about the real unparalleled campaign of Old Stonewall.

sources, even the *Official Records*,⁴² and his studies of Sherman's March to the Sea,⁴³ the Mississippi Valley campaigns, and the book he and Heros von Borcke wrote on the battle of Brandy Station show that he was capable of writing good history. Unfortunately his unstable financial condition and indestructible loyalty to the Confederacy⁴⁴ affected both the quantity and quality of his work.

Scheibert was more thorough as a military observer. One of the first European soldiers to understand the special characteristics of the Civil War armies, he was not deceived by appearances: Ragged men could fight. With reference to his visit in 1863, he later commented that "a three year war is . . . a good school to learn how to overcome fric-

"You would oblige me very much by giving me some hints about new or important publications about the War." Scheibert to John Page Nicholson, January 25, 1880. Microfilm copy of a letter bound in the Scheibert article, listed above, John Page Nicholson Collection, The Huntington Library, San Marino, California. Cf. *Catalogue of Library of Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel John Page Nicholson . . . Relating to the War of the Rebellion 1861-1866* (Philadelphia, 1914), p. 761. In another letter Scheibert listed no fewer than sixteen articles he had lifted from the *Southern Historical Society Papers* alone! Scheibert to J. William Jones, October 13, 1881, *Southern Historical Society Papers*, IX (1881), 570-572.

⁴²U. S. War Department. *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* (70 vols.; Washington, 1880-1901).

⁴³Scheibert, "Sherman's Marsch durch Georgien. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Sezessionskrieges," *Jahrbücher*, LVIII (1886), 13-35, 173-190. In this article one of the best Scheibert wrote after he left the army, he severely criticized Sherman's generalship, particularly on the celebrated March to the Sea. Curiously enough, in 1874 he had endorsed without qualification the remarks of another German student of the war, F. von Meerheimb, who praised Sherman in a lecture before a military audience in Berlin. See F. von Meerheimb, *Sherman's Feldzug in Georgien* (Berlin, 1869), *passim*. Scheibert's remarks on von Meerheimb's views are found in *La guerre civile*, pp. 303-307.

⁴⁴Scheibert once wrote that he and von Borcke "have brought it about that in the German-Prussian Army nothing concerning the Civil War . . . is so in fashion as accounts of the deeds of Southrons. Sherman and Grant, the pets of ten years ago, are forgotten, and Lee, Jackson and Stuart are now the favorite heroes of our officers." Scheibert to J. William Jones, October 13, 1881, *Southern Historical Society Papers*, IX, 571.

tion."⁴⁵ Believing, as most Europeans did, that the Southerner was intrinsically the better soldier (purer motives, good Anglo-Saxon stock, accustomed to outdoor life, and managerial experience on the plantations, etc.), he could see the Northern armies improving steadily both in quality and leadership, mobilizing vastly superior resources until even Lee's genius was unable to save the South from defeat.⁴⁶ Scheibert was particularly impressed by the accomplishments of the Union *Eisenbahn-Abteilung*,⁴⁷ an American innovation which had kept the railroads working so well that Prussia in 1866 created a similar Field Railway Section.⁴⁸

Scheibert was not wholly accurate in his analysis of the military operations of the Civil War. His division of infantry tactics into three distinct phases, for example, is basically sound, but oversimplified and distorted. Lee did in fact make greater use of intrenchments after Gettysburg, and partly—as Scheibert suggested—to compensate for his numerical inferiority.⁴⁹ But the Confederates had constructed extensive earthworks near Bull Run in 1861 and at Richmond the year following; Lee's fortifications at Fredericksburg in 1862 "marked a definite stage in the evolution of the field defenses,"⁵⁰ and in the campaign for Vicksburg, where Lee was not present, "the value of intrenchments

was demonstrated to a striking degree. . . ."⁵¹ Scheibert's arbitrary classification of Confederate cavalry into four neat categories—regular, partisan, scouts, and couriers—and his assertion that the Confederates habitually preferred shock tactics while the Union cavalry generally chose to fight dismounted likewise are subject to question. Stuart himself may have preferred the saber—it would have suited his flamboyant personality. But he did not hesitate to use firearms whenever the occasion demanded. Indeed, one explanation advanced by an officer on Stuart's staff for the comparative decline of the Confederate cavalry after 1863 was a serious shortage of "proper arms," placing

the Southern cavalry at a disadvantage which can hardly be overestimated. . . . Breechloading carbines were procured only in limited quantities, never more than enough to arm one, or at most two squadrons in a regiment. The deficiency was made up, generally, by Enfield rifles.

This writer pointedly remarked that "the difference between a Spencer carbine and an Enfield rifle is by no means a mere matter of sentiment."⁵²

Scheibert repeatedly underestimated the extent to which firepower dominated the battlefields of 1861-1865. In fact he took the position that the breechloader had created a new problem in that it encouraged troops to fire ammunition needlessly. Lee had once remarked something to this effect to Scheibert,⁵³ who apparently failed to consider that the Confederates were plagued by a chronic supply problem and that this condition would not necessarily be such a vital consideration in another war. Scheibert ap-

⁴⁵Mitt Schwert und Feder, p. 150.

⁴⁶*La guerre civile*, pp. 27, 38, 280; "General Lee," *Jahrbücher*, XVI, 99.

⁴⁷"Sherman's Marsch durch Georgien," *Jahrbücher*, LVIII, 179.

⁴⁸Edwin A. Pratt, *The Rise of Rail-power in War and Conquest* (London, 1915), p. 122; Hille und Meurin, *Geschichte der preussischen Eisenbahntruppen: I Von 1859 bis zur Beendigung des deutsch-französischen Krieges* (Berlin, 1910), pp. 4-5.

⁴⁹Lee's "use of field works did not date, as some authorities have claimed, from Mine Run [November, 1863], but from Fredericksburg and, more particularly, from Chancellorsville. After Mine Run, as the declining strength of the army forced it more and more to the defensive, field fortification became a routine. Every soldier was a military engineer." Freeman, *R. E. Lee*, III, 204.

⁵⁰*Ibid.*, II, 480.

⁵¹Arthur L. Wagner, "Hasty Intrenchments in the War of Secession," *M. H. S. P.*, XIII, 139.

⁵²H. B. McClellan, *The Life and Campaigns of Major-General J. E. B. Stuart* (Boston and New York, 1885), pp. 260-261.

⁵³*La guerre civile*, p. 46.

preciated the fact that intrenchments strengthened the defense, but he attributed the development of trench warfare after Gettysburg more to Lee's inferiority in numbers than to the superiority of modern weapons.

He made the same error with respect to cavalry tactics. In stating that dismounted tactics were especially popular with the Union cavalry, it evidently did not strike Scheibert as inconsistent that "inferior" cavalry should resort to allegedly inferior tactics in order to compensate for their inferiority. Surely Major-General James H. Wilson, an outstanding Union cavalry officer, was closer to the truth when he wrote:

The armament of cavalry is of great importance, but not until the closing days of the war did we wake up to what our experience . . . ought to have taught us. My division was the first division in the Army of the Potomac that had first-class repeating arms. Green regiments, that you couldn't have driven into a fight with the old arms, became invincible the very moment that good arms were placed in their hands. . . . there are only two arms that cavalry should use in modern warfare,—the repeating magazine gun, either rifle or carbine, and the revolver.⁵⁴

This tendency to minimize the effect of firepower on Civil War tactics is explained, in part at least, by the nature of Scheibert's mission to the Confederacy and the time and extent of his visit. He had been sent specifically to observe the effect of modern artillery fire upon fortifications. He returned to Europe while the war was still in what he later designated as the second phase, the period of linear tactics. Scheibert witnessed the battle of Chancellorsville, where miles of

breastworks had been erected by both armies. He was not present, however, to observe the trench warfare of 1864. Similarly, when Scheibert had visited Lee's army Stuart's cavalry was at its peak. By mere chance he was at Brandy Station, the only major cavalry battle during the entire war in which shock tactics were employed successfully on a large scale. Had he remained long enough to see the gradual decline in the Confederate cavalry after 1863, or had he been able to meet Forrest⁵⁵ or see Sheridan's cavalry in action in 1864, very probably he would have had a better understanding of the transformation that had taken place in cavalry tactics.

These limitations, however, do not detract from the overall validity of Scheibert's observations. He probably saw more actual combat than the official observers of any of the other European armies; certainly he was the most competent foreign authority on the Army of Northern Virginia, and he was the only foreign observer to make a special study of the tactics of all three arms.⁵⁶ Scheibert

⁵⁵"Very early in the war Forrest had learned that men on horseback could do slight execution with fire-arms as compared to those dismounted and taking advantage of all possible means for the protection and steadiness of aim, and he adopted this method of fighting, using his horses chiefly for transporting his troops." John Allan Wyeth, *Life of Lieutenant-General Nathan Bedford Forrest* (New York, 1908), p. 648.

⁵⁶Major Ferdinand Lecomte, a Swiss observer with McClellan's army in 1862, confined his official report to what he saw during the Peninsular campaign. See *The War in the United States. Report to the Swiss Military Department* . . . (New York, 1863), *passim*. Lecomte also wrote a general history entitled *Guerre de la sécession* (3 vols.; Paris, 1866-1867). The confidential reports of two British military missions to the United States deal almost exclusively with the types and quality of American arms. See Capt. T. Mahon, Capt. R. Grant, and Lt. T. C. Price, *Report on American Armies, Gunnery, Ordnance, etc.* [The War Office, A 0174, 1862] and Lt. Col. T. L. Gallwey and Capt. H. J. Alderson, *Report upon the Military Affairs of the United States of America* [The War Office, A 0229, 1864]. The official report of Colonel François DeChenal and Captain Gusman, of the French Army, concerned four specific categories: (1) "Causes and probable results of the war"; (2) "The American [Union] Army"; (3) "Description of the arms and

⁵⁴"The Cavalry of the Army of the Potomac," *M. H. S. P.*, XIII, 85-86. A former Confederate cavalry officer expressed his opinion that by the end of the war "the cavalry of the Army of the Potomac was the most efficient body of soldiers on earth." Holmes Conrad, "The Cavalry Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia," in Francis Trevelyan Miller, ed., *The Photographic History of the Civil War* (New York, 1911), IV, 114.

recognized the problems of recruitment, training, transportation, and supply peculiar to America, and appreciated the influence these had exerted upon strategy and tactics. Above all, he was one of the first to interpret the Civil War as a product of the industrial age.

Probably the most significant fact about Scheibert as a military observer is that he really saw very little to recommend for adoption by the Prussian Army. Indeed he stressed the similarities between the Civil War armies and his own. Lee's infantry in 1863 and the Prussian infantry in 1870, according to Scheibert, had many characteristics in common. Both had abandoned the column in favor of the line as the standard combat formation. In each case this dispersion of force and the frequent dissemination of the advance echelons had placed a greater burden on the junior officers, resulting in slacker control from the field commander in battle (Scheibert cited Wörth and Spicheren as typical examples). Both armies had also shown a tendency to commit reserve units prematurely. The chief difference, Scheibert decided, was that the Prussian Army benefited from superior peacetime training and indoctrination and thus was better able to cope with this new situation. As for the cavalry, Scheibert considered the German cavalry superior to the cavalry of the Civil War in most respects. But whereas the Prussian infantry had achieved greater cohesion in battle by means of superior junior officers, the Confederate cavalry had gained the same result through its efficient courier service. Scheibert, therefore, recommended the adoption of a comparable body of couriers in the German cavalry. He also

munitions of war in use in the American Army"; (4) "Construction and manufacture of arms and munitions of war. Arsenals and private factories." Part two of this report was later published separately by DeChenal under the title *The American Army in the War of Secession* (Fort Leavenworth, 1894).

professed to see a basic similarity in the tactics of field artillery in 1863 and 1870.⁵⁷

The appearance in 1874 of Scheibert's *Der Bürgerkrieg in den nordamerikanischen Staaten* sparked an outburst of writing in Germany on the Civil War. And almost without exception, those who wrote about any Civil War topic reflected the views of Scheibert. They accepted his analysis of Civil War tactics; they agreed with his observations on the power of rifled artillery against fortifications; they endorsed his opinion that the cavalry raid was not applicable in Europe, and they shared his reservations about the use of field fortifications. These writers, too, were impressed by the war effort of the Americans. They found the war instructive with regard to matériel and technology and most of them appreciated the significance of Northern industry, the role of sea power, and the influence of the western campaigns upon the outcome of the war.⁵⁸

By 1880, however, most German soldiers had ceased to show an active interest in the Civil War. Scheibert continued to supplement his income by translating and writing articles on the war for the military journals, but he was practically alone. The Civil War was not taught at the *Kriegsakademie*, nor did it ever become the subject of an official

⁵⁷*La guerre civile*, pp. 68-75, 121-129, 136, 158-182; "General Lee," *Jahrbücher*, XVI, 208-209.

⁵⁸Typical of the many German studies of the Civil War during this period are the following: "Aus dem amerikanischen Secessionskriege. Feldzüge am Mississippi 1862 und 1863," *Jahrbücher*, XIV (1875), 59-82, 166-187, 251-282; "Beitrag zur Charakteristik des nordamerikanischen Secessionskrieges," *ibid.*, XIX (1876), 177-188, 247-260; C. von Bredow, "Ueber die Leistungen der amerikanischen Cavallerie im Secessionskriege. Historische Studie," *ibid.*, XXIII (1877), 200-221; 347-358; M. von Wedell, "Operationen der Potomac-Armee unter General Grant im amerikanischen Secessionskriege 1864 und 1865," *ibid.*, XXIV (1877), 79-86, 282-325; E. W., "Ueber die verwendung der Feld-Ärillerie im nordamerikanischen Secessions-Kriege," *ibid.*, XXX (1879), 55-69, 134-147; and "Charakteristische momente der Kriegführung im nordamerikanischen Secessionskriege," *ibid.*, XXXVIII (1880), 32-51, 152-166, 261-274.

did not attempt to do so, as our total air capability discouraged them at that time. Allied airpower provided a catalytic agent to help solve the basically nonmilitary problem of winning West Berlin to our side.

"Operation Vittles" to Berlin was an example of airpower at its peacetime finest, serving national objectives and actually performing multiple functions in the above categories (ideological, psychological, etc.), as well as its predominant military role. But the situation has changed radically since the days of the blockade. "The Soviet threat is more real today than at any time since 1947," says George Kennan, our foremost Soviet expert. If this is so, then another Berlin Airlift might not be so feasible, because of a change in the balance of rival airpower forces. The rise of Soviet airpower has caused us to take a new look at our own airpower. Witness the select U. S. Senate subcommittee headed by Senator Symington appointed in the spring of 1956 to investigate our military air arm's mission.

In this respect we are cautioned by Air Marshal Sir John Slessor (RAF Ret.), one of the West's outstanding airpower spokesmen, when he warns against "the popular tendency . . . to expect too much of airpower . . . to regard it as a panacea, a shortcut to world peace and security." Even the former USAF Chief of Staff, General Nathan Twining, states a worthwhile axiom which parallels Slessor's, when he says the power of our nation's air arm "as an influence for peace and safety is a relative power."

Both of these two authorities are in a position to place airpower in its proper perspective, i.e., to view it as a dynamic weapon of military power, with variable degrees of influence in safeguarding world peace. Because war itself is but part of the whole, which is politics (to paraphrase Lenin), we should keep in mind this fact in regarding

airpower's role as a part of a nation's power spectrum and not the whole spectrum.

This factor of "relative power" which is forever changing (depending on the capabilities of our own air force in being versus the enemy's at any one time) is probably the most important single factor which prevents a clear understanding of airpower's ability to maintain the peace. The placing of a *time* and *place* string on any definition of airpower's potential, particularly in a war or peace situation, is necessary to obtain a true picture of airpower in its fluid state.

Even though airpower is not all-powerful, it is the "dominant factor," as Field Marshal Montgomery (a ground man and Deputy Chief of Staff of NATO) puts it. That this dominant military role is not absolute is probably a blessing in disguise, for then Lord Acton's famous aphorism that "power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely," would be worth nothing.

Admiral Radford, formerly chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, concurs with the Field Marshal when he states: "Today airpower is the dominant factor in war. It may not win a war by itself alone, but without it no major war can be won. As far as we are concerned, it is a primary requirement, both offensively and defensively, and in support of our other forces." This statement offers one more authoritative attitude as to the proper perspective of airpower.

The healthy characteristic of airpower in its ascendancy to the dominant factor is its ability to take and share criticism, because it is not an *absolute* type of power. This lack of monopoly is the *only* military factor of national power has kept airmen and airpower proponents "on their toes" and open-minded as to what airpower can really do.

This overview of a framework for airpower should enable one to better appreciate what airpower can and cannot do in the

light of the foregoing limitations.

If we could set as a goal the words of General Laurence Kuter, Commander of the Far East Air Forces, who declared that "the greatest victory that airpower could win, and its finest service to humanity, would be as an instrument of national policy to avoid war, preserve our ideals and establish a secure and just peace," then our philosophical faith in airpower would be justified.

II. FUNCTIONS OF AIRPOWER

A strong advocate of airpower believes that it should be employed as a "single instrument" or "entity." This factor of centralized control is essential if airpower is to carry its proper weight and to exploit its potential with complete flexibility. Major Alexander de Seversky, a noted airpower authority, puts it this way: "The air ocean is one and indivisible and must be controlled by a single, homogeneous force." This was the first lesson learned by Air Force leaders in North Africa in World War II.

Airpower is indivisible, when one considers that we never have enough aircraft to do the necessary job in winning the air battle in war. To divert airpower to less important tasks in war would be to lose the air battle and the war. Airpower is also indivisible because of the global characteristics of present day air vehicles. With the speed, mobility, flexibility, and range of present-day aircraft, we could very well lose the air battle by placing airpower in compartments rather than through some sort of centralized command control.

The three dimensional medium in which air forces operate makes it imperative that, to fully exploit the flexibility of airpower, air forces need to be employed as a "single aggregate instrument." This last phrase is found embodied in the official *U.S. Air Force Basic Doctrine* (AFM 1-2), 1 April 1955. Although this short manual does not

define "airpower," it does stress the "indivisibility" of the medium in which airpower operates, which in turn has many implications for the organization and mission of our combat air commands. It is not in the purview of this examination, however, to comment further on the control and organization of airpower, but rather on its *functions* and *goals*.

If airpower is "the ability of the nation to assert its will via the air medium" as De Seversky suggests, then it follows that in order to assert itself, airpower needs to obtain a relative "control of the air."

CONTROL OF THE AIR

Again we look to the basic doctrine (AFM 1-2, noted previously) for guidance in defining this essential attribute of airpower. It states: "United States Air Forces are employed to gain and exploit a dominant position in the air both in peace and in war. The desired dominant position is control of the air."

If air forces can gain and exploit a high degree of "control of the air" in peace or war in a relatively-near absolute degree, then we can define airpower tentatively as "*the ability of a nation to control the air.*"

This definition, broad as it is, enables us to take a more realistic look at the application of this philosophical concept in peace and war. Through it we may discover how the theory can stand up in practice as a means toward accomplishing world peace and security.

1. Control of the Air in Peace

Not only did the United States reap the ideological benefits of the Berlin Airlift, but she has profited from other lesser known mercy airlifts as well. The airlifting of Moslems to Mecca in 1952, known as "Operation Magic Carpet," and the large-scale relief and rescue operations during the catastrophic

East Pakistan floods of 1954 are but two of the more significant airlifts of mercy made possible because we had a dominant position in the air at the time and could exploit these peaceful uses of airpower. During the disastrous floods in Western Europe and the Lowlands in 1953, and the winter freeze of 1956, the world witnessed demonstrations of the peacetime use of airpower when the USAF and allied nations dropped food and supplies to the beleaguered peoples. The annual summer Kinderlift of children from Berlin to West Germany is yet another example in this category.

The benefits of conducting these peacetime airpower operations are many. Not only are we able to thwart the enemy, but we are able to strengthen our friends and favorably influence neutrals.

To maintain the necessary control of the air to carry out the peacetime operations requires the backing of a combat air force in being, capable of carrying out wartime tasks. Such a degree of airpower means air vehicles and weapons which are operational, trained personnel who are qualified to operate and maintain this weapons system, adequate logistics support, as well as high *esprit de corps* and the knowledge which is necessary to assure that all these elements of airpower are united in a harmonious manner to carry out the mission. Airpower has greater ability to perform peacetime functions than either land or sea forces because of its mobility.

In addition to providing a highly qualified air force-in-being during peacetime and the carrying out of mercy missions to aid in the ideological war, one further function of airpower should not be overlooked: the continuous study, analysis and development of airpower doctrine, to insure that a "control of the air" concept is practicable in a realistic combat situation as well as in theory.

2. Control of the Air in War (Total or Limited)

"Control of the air" means the ability of a nation to defeat, dominate, or influence its enemies in a limited or a global war. This concept in application has changed drastically from the first-priority targets of World War II bombers, the enemy's industry, to the present-day targets, which are air forces and air installations.

This shift is actually a return to World War I Italian Air General Giulio Douhet's major precept of hitting enemy armed forces first and then following up on industrial complexes as secondary targets. This change has been brought about because of the increased intercontinental air capabilities of other powers, as well as the advent of nuclear weapons. Because hostile air forces are now the primary military concern of our security, they must consequently be the priority target of our total air forces. However, many problems arise to haunt airpower combat operations planners in determining targets and missions. One of the most significant of these is aptly stated by an important World War II plans officer, General Laurence Kuter, who has this to say in his recent book, *Airman at Yalta* (1955):

The problem which plagues airmen is the establishment of the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of strategic air operations. A general statement can be made that the airmen's concepts and *plans* were always well ahead of the *means* [my italics] required adequately to execute the plans. But, unlike some surface operations, air operations were *not* deferred until adequate means were at hand. Unlike all surface operations, the results of air operations deep into enemy territory could not be evaluated quickly or with complete assurance.

Despite the handicaps and frustrations which beset airpower planners as so ably pointed out by General Kuter, we are still

faced with the primary problem in war strategy of "winning command of the air," as Field Marshal Montgomery puts it. This essential first task of our airpower, with the air battle from D Day to D + 10 being the decisive phase, is the foundation upon which the rest of an airpower philosophy is built.

Once the counter air battle is won, airpower can then devote its energies to defeating the land and water surface forces of the enemy. This stage (called counter-surface in Air Force terminology) can, in many instances, make the man with the bayonet unnecessary, particularly in preventing friendly territories from being overrun by numerically superior enemy ground forces. This stage usually will follow the counterair phase in point of time and effort during a future war.

The third and last wartime function of airpower, counter resources, pertains to the bombing of enemy factories and cities, including his will to make war. This function was the primary task of our Air Forces in Europe and Japan in World War II, but nuclear weapons have reduced this function to a lower category of priorities in carrying out the first two wartime airpower tasks—counterair and counter-surface bonus effects, for the counter-resources task is inevitable in accomplishing the first two tasks. Whether further counter-resources operations are considered necessary will be carried out after the battle for control of the air is won. Wholesale destruction of cities is not implied. With the spectrum of available weapons and with the delivery accuracies now being achieved, any desired degree of destruction can be caused.

III. TOWARD A DYNAMIC PHILOSOPHY OF AIRPOWER

One of the greatest airpower thinkers which the 20th century has yet produced,

Douhet, coined a precept back in the post-World War I days which still holds true. Douhet's thesis was that "victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in the character of war, not upon those who wait to adapt themselves after they occur." This is the challenge facing those in the Western world who are attempting to formulate a working philosophy of airpower to meet the Communist military and ideological threat.

We can assume along with the former Secretary of the Air Force Donald Quarles, in a New York speech on February 25, 1956, that nuclear weapons would soon produce a "balance of terror" in which no nation would dare start a war because of the retaliatory power of its enemies. This fact, according to Quarles, has led to a state of peace called "mutual deterrence" which has been caused by a fear of starting wars.

This new strategic situation is leading to a revolutionary change in the thinking about the science (and philosophy) of waging war. In the prenuclear days we kept our methods and weapons of waging war secret from the enemy, but in the present state of the science and philosophy of *detering* war, it may be wise to let the enemy know our capabilities. An "open sky" policy, suggested in President Eisenhower's dramatic plea before the United Nations in the summer of 1955 for a mutual aerial reconnaissance, is an example of this new shift in policy from secrecy to open-mindedness.

A parallel to mutual aerial inspection could be an announced policy of "selective destruction" of targets, which would not only be for the enemy's benefit but to clear up misunderstanding in the minds of our own citizens as to the destructive capabilities of nuclear weapons. Through the use of selective destruction tactics, we could deny an enemy an airfield and his planes without inflicting great personnel casualties on the

air base or in the surrounding civilian populace. This could be accomplished with a nuclear air burst instead of a surface burst which would reduce radioactive fallout in the surrounding area. Such a confinement of the atomic contamination to a limited area would make for few enemy ground personnel casualties in the advent of another conflict. Such knowledge, which could prevent a repetition of a future Hiroshima- or Nagasaki-type bombing, would be in keeping with this philosophy.

If enough of the world can be made to realize the "universality of potential destruction," which Winston Churchill so eloquently warned would be the price of another intercontinental nuclear war, then this realization "may yet lead to the abolition of war." This is the ultimate goal of a democratic airpower philosophy—free-world airpower strong enough to keep the peace, so that it need never be used.

To break away from the traditional thinking of the impact of thermonuclear air warfare in the minds of many Western military leaders, it behooves us to take a look at the proposals of Rear Admiral Sir Anthony Buzzard (recently retired Chief of British Naval Intelligence) as a substitute for the "massive retaliation" doctrine. He bases his plea for graduated deterrence on four grounds. They are summed up briefly as follows:

1. "Moral. . . . It is essential if the West is to neutralize . . . Russian and Chinese superiority in manpower to use our . . . superiority in tactical atomic weapons in the event of local aggression.

2. "Political. That as well as being brutal, massive retaliation alienates neutral opinion. . . .

3. "Military. Graduated deterrence conforms to the basic military principle that one should concentrate on the enemy's armed forces rather than his people.

4. "Economic. It is because we are not sure that we are going to use it (massive retaliation, which the author considers more economical) that we try to maintain both large tactical forces and strategic forces, thus loading ourselves with heavy defense budgets."

Although Admiral Buzzard makes sense in the first three areas, he appears to have fallen into the fallacy of balancing the budget at the expense of survival. In facing up to the reality of the Communist air threat today, we need both tactical and strategic forces to make "graduated deterrence" work. A swift, mobile tactical striking force is needed to counter the aggressor's first flow in support of the strategic air plan. With this force backed up by a long-range strategic bomber force, "graduated deterrence" takes on the dual meaning of a deterrent defense in depth and the ability to destroy targets "selectively."

Admiral Buzzard's prescription, however, merits consideration as it emphasizes the shift in the thinking of our airpower's utilization in future conflict as being aimed toward the enemy's air forces (and other armed forces) rather than people and industry. As the science of deterrence involves psychological methods as well as military power, we need to take into consideration psychological as well as military factors. The four areas which Admiral Buzzard outlines, the moral, political, military, and economic, represent the territory where more careful study is needed in the science and art of waging war.

The air vehicle's coming of age as the prime weapon in our nation's arsenal has led to a significant revolution in the thinking of airmen. General Charles A. Lindbergh, in a speech before the Institute of Aeronautical Sciences on January 25, 1954, pointed out the changed role of the aviator: "In aviation, our old carefree fascination with the art of

flight has metamorphosed into a responsibility for the welfare of mankind and the security of our American people."

To carry out this responsibility, airmen and airpower advocates will have to continue to keep in mind the philosophical guide lines, which General Hap Arnold offered his disciples shortly before his death: "No longer must tradition or loud shouting be the controlling factors. . . . All of us must keep our thinking elastic, resilient; our personal

preferences, opinions, desires and ambitions subordinate to the general good; our vision adjusted to overall and perhaps uncharted horizons, rather than to limited, familiar areas."

If Arnold's dictum is followed by those who are grappling with the airpower capability which technology has wrought, then the West need have no fear as to airpower's role in the future of world peace and security.

SIGNAL CORPS ORANGE

BY PAUL J. SCHEIPS

Today, as for many years past, orange and white (orange piped with white) are the official distinctive colors of the Army Signal Corps,¹ with the use of orange, as the principal color, predominating. Orange is a rich, full-bodied color, bright and distinctive wherever used.

Colors, as anyone knows who has at least a nodding acquaintance with the subject, have much tradition associated with them. It is therefore interesting if not downright amusing to journey into the heraldic field in search of this tradition as it bears on the various colors that have been borne by the Signal Corps, especially its famous orange.²

The irreverent ones cannot but be amused by the attachment of virtues and other representations in English heraldry to metals and colors used in coats of arms. Yellow, logical-

ly enough, as on the Cavalry uniform once worn by Signal Corpsmen, is held to represent the metal gold (*or*), which stands for constancy, though everyone knows that gold is a fickle wench forever changing hands. Yellow's corresponding stone is the topaz and its planet is Sol. White represents the metal silver (*argent*) and stands for innocence, or so some heralds would have us believe. Its stone is the pearl and its planet Luna. Black, which once darkened the Signal Corps uniform, is the sable of heraldry whose virtue is prudence. This we should be glad to learn since its corresponding stone is the diamond or lozenge, today the insigne of the Army Finance Corps—but in heraldry the figure reserved for the distaff side of the house. The distinctive colors of the Finance Corps are silver gray and golden yellow instead of black, which now dignifies the Chaplains.

Orange is the name of a town and former small principality in France, which gave its name to a princely line from whence came William III of England and the present

¹SR 600-60-1, D/A, 8 April 1953.

²Here I have found most helpful the following volumes: J[ames] R[obinson] Planché, *The Pursuivant of Arms* (3d ed.; London, 1874); Hugh Clark (ed. J. R. Planché), *An Introduction to Heraldry* (18th ed.; London, 1892); Eugene Zieber, *Heraldry in America* (2d ed.; Philadelphia, 1909), who cites Planché's Clark; and Sir Christopher and Adrian Lynch-Robinson, *Intelligible Heraldry* (London, 1948).

royal house of the Netherlands. An Orangeman, therefore, is not a member of the Signal Corps, but a person honoring William of Orange and a member of a secret society organized in the north of Ireland in 1795, wearing orange-colored flowers or an orange sash, in defense of the reigning British sovereign and the Protestant religion.

English heraldry, older than William of Orange, admits the color orange (*tenné* or tawny), according to Planché's Clark, but neither uses it in its bearings nor attaches any virtue to it. The Lynch-Robinsons, describing *tenné* as "tawny-brown," say that it and sanguine, elsewhere described as the color of cold blood, "are so rare in English heraldry that, once having been mentioned, they may be promptly forgotten," but add that they are found frequently in French heraldry. They also add that the Irish Office of Arms sometimes uses these colors and that the Irish national flag might be described as being partly *tenné*, while Scotland uses *tenné* in bordures, which are shield frames in heraldry. The hyacinth, the red stone of the ancients, corresponds to *tenné* and has been used in the blazonry of peers. (As a flower the hyacinth is a member of the lily family, of all things!) For a heraldic virtue it thus seems that the Signal Corps can claim only the innocence of white—paltry stuff for a fighting arm.

The fact of the matter is that some would explain this lack of a virtue for the color orange by the outright charge that both *tenné* and sanguine were "stains" used in abatements of honor, charges placed upon coats of arms to denote dishonorable actions of the bearers. To illustrate, it may be claimed that *tenné* would have been used variously on the coats of arms of old reprobates in armor who were guilty of such ungentlemanly misdemeanors as boasting, drunkenness, killing a prisoner who had

yielded, or revoking a challenge. The abatement of one guilty of seduction or rape would have been an escutcheon reversed in the color of cold blood. The whole question of abatements, however, is a controversial one, with the general view being that they were never used. But the Lynch-Robinsons suggest "that you cannot have good conduct marks without bad . . . , and that whilst any knight who really disgraced his arms would have them taken away . . . , in addition to other and probably very drastic punishments, there is no reason why the minor peccadilloes of the medieval knight should not have been recorded until by some deed of valour he wiped out the stain on his escutcheon—for abatements are alleged to have been only of a temporary nature." Nevertheless, this lets the Signal Corps off the hook in only a left-handed sort of way, so that we may thank Planché for riding to the rescue with a specific defense of orange in his *Pursuivant of Arms*:

Some heraldic writers extend the number of tinctures to seven, by the addition of sanguine or murrey, dark blood or mulberry-colour, and *tenné*, tawny, or orange-colour; while others who admit them into the catalogue declare them, at the same time, to be *stainant*, or disgraceful; but, . . . it is very improbable any one would bear arms so degraded; and the strongest proof that no such opinion with respect to these two colours existed in the days of chivalry is, that the livery colours of the house of York were murrey and blue, and that tawny was apparently much affected by the retainers of the nobility and Church dignitaries. "Enter Winchester [Cardinal Beaufort], with his serving-men in tawny coats." . . . "And by the way the Bishop of London met him, attended on by a goodly company of gentlemen in tawny coats." . . . The pages of the Earl of Nottingham, temp. James I, wore tawny velvet guarded with black . . . ; and many other instances might be quoted. It is not likely that princes, protectors, and nobles would have selected for their liveries colours, which were marks of shame. . . . Gerrard Leigh pronounces *tenné*

a worshipful colour, which the heralds sometimes call bruske;" and sanguine, "a princely colour;" . . . While, however, I deny the *stainant* character of these colours, I do not feel inclined to admit them into the company of heraldic tinctures, as I question their having ever been properly introduced in coats of arms, although much used for liveries. Leigh mentions two families that bore *tenné*, but without proof . . .

Perhaps a further observation is in order. An observation and a caution. One of the heraldic distinctions viewed by Planché's Clark as "purely visionary, . . . mere affection," and "nowhere used but in England, being justly held in ridicule in all other countries, . . . a fantastic humour of our nation," was the expression of orange by the planet Dragon's Head. Immediately there is called to the layman's mind either a griffin or a tale out of Sax Rohmer. But this is an error, for

the Dragon's Head of heraldry is simply an expression of orange somehow suggested by the astronomical phenomenon of the ascending node of the moon or a planet, which is known as Dragon's Head. (The color of cold blood, on the other hand, represents the Dragon's Tail, the descending node.) Heraldry would not sanction the placing of a draconic head onto the Signal Corps standard in an effort to regain the heroic face lost through cohabitation with Innocence. It would seem better, therefore, for the Corps to keep its presently authorized standard with an orange background bearing embroidered in its center that old bird the American eagle "holding in his dexter talons an olive branch and in his sinister a bundle of 13 arrows. . . ."³ Praise the Lord and pass the ammunition!

³SR 840-10-1, D/A, 28 October 1952.

YORKTOWN DAY CELEBRATION

As we go to press word was received that the historic battle of Yorktown, which assured American independence, will be reenacted on the famous battleground at Yorktown, 19 October 1957. Reenactment of the Yorktown siege will highlight the largest celebration of the annual Yorktown Day since the 1931 sesquicentennial. This year's observance will include the dedication of the Yorktown Victory Monument with its new 14-foot figure of 'Liberty' sculptured by Oskar J. W. Hansen of Charlottesville, Va. The figure replaces the original one damaged by lightning in 1942. The National Park Service announced that British and French representatives were invited to attend.

All the military services will be represented at the observance, along with some of the oldest military units in the nation, such as the Governor's Foot Guard of Hartford, the Richmond (Va.) Light Infantry Blues, and the New York Veteran Corps of Artillery.

FRED DUSTIN

The American Military Institute has lost another prominent member in the death of Fred Dustin, 15 May 1957, at Saginaw, Michigan. Born 12 October 1866 at Glen Falls, N. Y., as Fred O'Donnell, he adopted the surname of the uncle who raised him after his mother died.

Coming to Michigan in 1887, he became interested in the rich field of Indian village sites and artifacts in Saginaw County, accumulating a collection of some 6000 arrow heads, tools and pottery, which he presented to the University of Michigan. He arranged for his extensive library on the American Indian, probably the most complete on the Custer Campaign of 1876, to be kept intact.

Fred Dustin was an author and authority on American Indian lore and culture. His *The Custer Tragedy* is one of the best objective histories of Custer's last battles.

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THE MILITARY LIBRARY

Editor: GEORGE J. STANSFIELD

REVIEWS

The Fatal Decisions. By Generals Wiener Kreipe, Gunther, Blumentritt, Fritz Bayerlein, Kurt Zeitzler, Bodo Zimmerman, and Hasso von Manteuffel, with a commentary by General Siegfried Westphal. Ed. Seymour Freiden and William Richardson. Trans. Constantine Fitzgibbon. (New York: William Sloane Associates, 1956. Pp. 302. Maps. \$4.00.)

This book deals with six prolonged battles: Britain, Moscow, El Alamein, Stalingrad, France 1944, and the Ardennes, in which fateful command decisions were made that led to the utter defeat of Germany in World War II. The authors are all generals who in one way or another were involved in carrying out the decisions about which they write. Begun as staff studies on failures in high command immediately after the war while the generals were prisoners of the U. S. Army, the series was later developed into a book. The original studies were sponsored by the U. S. Army Historical Division in Europe, then headed by Col. S. L. A. Marshall, who incidentally wrote the Foreword, in the belief American military leaders can learn as much if not more from studying the causes of defeat than those of victory.

In general, each contributor stresses the facts that bear on the particular decision or decisions about which he is writing. General Westphal fills in the gaps and analyzes the over-all military situation in an effort to give continuity and breadth to the book. While Westphal's contributions are necessarily brief, they do not ignore political and economic developments as factors that determined the course of the war. Nor, for that matter, do the others.

All the authors are critical of Hitler and hold him and his chief advisors responsible for the major errors committed. While this may sound like

an old refrain chanted by men seeking a scapegoat for their own mistakes, the views they express on Hitler's management of the war are in accord with the findings of objective historians and the observations of many Allied leaders.

No one who has studied the war will disagree, for example, with General Kreipe that Hitler's decision to strike at Britain by air without a firm intention of following it with a Cross-Channel attack was a mistake. But there were other bad decisions that Kreipe might have stressed more than he does. One such is the blunder Hitler committed when he directed the German Air Force to shift its attack to London and other cities before knocking out the airfields on which British fighters were based. It was this decision that gave the British fighters a chance to recover their breath and in so doing destroyed whatever chance the Germans may have had of winning the Battle of Britain.

Blumentritt in his clear logical treatment of the campaigns for Moscow exhibits exceptional understanding of the many factors that influence the outcome of battle and shows more than a bowing acquaintance with history. Aside from the fateful major decisions to open a two-front war and then to try to seize too many objectives at once, there were many other mistakes made that led to the loss of the campaign. Most were Hitler's but not all. The decision made at the Orsha Conference in November to make one more attempt to take Moscow rather than dig in and wait until spring before renewing the offensive, for example, had the support of many military leaders. The attack failed and was followed by a withdrawal which was halted by Hitler. That the Germans escaped the fate of Napoleon's Grand Army is one of the miracles of the war. It may well have

been the result of Hitler's order even though it was dictated by his chronic unwillingness to give up ground.

The study of the campaign that led to El Alamein was prepared by General Bayerlein, Rommel's Chief of Staff at the time. It contains a graphic account of the trials and tribulations suffered by the "Desert Fox" in his efforts to secure logistical support for his operations before the battle. Of all the many mistakes made, the failure to seize Malta which lay athwart Rommel's supply line was the greatest. Rommel, we learn, did not insist on the capture of the stronghold but only because he was assured that the fuel to sustain his offensive could be supplied from Crete and was already on the way. None arrived and the attack failed. Rommel then wanted to withdraw at once but Hitler ordered him to lead his troops to "victory or death." After an inner struggle Rommel decided to comply with the impossible order. Later when his front was smashed, he risked being court-martialed and gave the order to disengage, thus saving the remnants of his army from destruction.

The Stalingrad study prepared by General Zeitzler, successor of General Halder as Chief of the Army General Staff, abounds with fateful decisions, all of which were Hitler's. That the Sixth Army could have been saved, had von Paulus been given freedom of action to break out of the beleaguered city even as late as mid-December becomes abundantly clear. Preferring to listen to Goering, who insisted that Stalingrad could be adequately supplied by air, rather than to Manstein, Zeitzler, and Hube, he remained obstinate in his determination not to give up the foothold on the Volga. More than the others, Zeitzler in his writing shows bitterness and contempt for Hitler and the sychophants that surrounded him.

The account of the fighting in France after the landings in Normandy is the work of General Bodo Zimmerman, Chief of Operations of Army Group "D" at the time. As such he worked closely with Field Marshals von Rundstedt and Rommel, who were responsible for the defense of the West. Again Hitler is blamed for the defeat because he bound his commanders to his theory that the enemy must be defeated on the beaches. That the two field marshals disagreed basically on how the defense should be conducted, as has often been stated, is not supported by this study. On the contrary they seem to have been

of like mind and twice appeared together before Hitler to urge their views on him. The handicaps they suffered as a result of Hitler's "fortress mania" were lack of flexibility and waste of manpower. Just to hold the Channel Islands, for example, tied up an entire reinforced division with its costly equipment. Altogether Zimmerman estimates the army was deprived of nearly 200,000 men, many of them first-class troops, who, had they been available, would have made possible the creation of a sizeable maneuverable reserve that might have effected the outcome of the battle. There were many other mistakes, not the least of which were the confusion in command channels and the frequent changes in commanders. For both Hitler was responsible.

The Ardennes story is told by General von Manteuffel, commander of the 5th Panzer Army and one of the leading participants in the battle. Whatever hope the Germans may have had for victory he believes was lost when Hitler rejected modifications to his plan which would limit initial objectives and insisted on his larger solution to drive across the Meuse and then to Antwerp regardless of the danger to the flanks of the advancing armies. His assignment of the leading role to the Sixth SS Panzer Army, whose junior commanders and staff lacked the tactical ability to cope with a rapidly developing situation was, in von Manteuffel's opinion, an act of folly. One is inclined to agree with this statement for it was this force that failed to drive ahead relentlessly and committed strong forces against islands of resisting Americans. The confusion and delay that resulted led to the loss of momentum. The situation might have been retrieved and the initiative regained had the Supreme Command not insisted on strict adherence to its original plan and had not too much German strength been massed to take Bastogne.

Although many questions raised in these six studies have since been explained and some points proved wrong by historians who have had access to materials not available to the authors, few will quarrel with the main conclusions. The studies are most valuable because they enable the reader to see the war as it was fought on the other side of the hill. For this reason and many others, they are worthy of the serious attention of students of military affairs.

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The Signal Corps: The Emergency (To December 1941). "United States Army in World War II: The Technical Services." By Dulany Terrett. (Washington, D. C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1956. Pp. xiii + 383. Illustrated. \$3.50 at the U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C.)

In *The Signal Corps: The Emergency*, Dulany Terrett has been led by his subject to write a distinctive kind of military history. It deals with preparations rather than with actual operations, yet in this field it is just those steps taken before the outbreak of hostilities which are the most decisive of actions. The administrative structure had to be prominent, and the technique of supply often dominated the Signal Corps scene, but these aspects are never ends in themselves. The slow pace of the 1930's when pigeons and wire loomed larger than radio, is no more the whole tempo of the book than is the fevered adaptation to new concepts of warfare, to thousands of draftees, to millions in appropriations which marked 1940 and 1941. It is at blending one into the other that Mr. Terrett excels. Before 1939, mobilization was an act of the imagination, an attempt to envisage in a list of specifications a situation which did not exist. As it turned out, the most fevered dream never remotely resembled the realities which made hash of the Protective Mobilization Plan and demanded a gigantic improvisation. Mr. Terrett uses all these strings, plucking first one and then the other as he moves chronologically through the various stages of awareness which marked the emergency. It is perhaps fortunate that he was not himself personally a part of events he describes and that from his own training he bears the mark of the humanities. For his account shows both balance and judgment. He always strives to plumb the whole meaning of the Signal Corps experience, even when fighting his way through a thicket of SCR-numbers which stand indiscriminately for many different types of equipment. He is not afraid of the colorful metaphor, and, more important, his urbanity is unruffled either by anachronisms such as the pigeons or by dead ends in the research effort such as thermal detection of aircraft.

The true distinction of this particular story lies in its treatment of the role of research and development. World War II was an atomic war only in its final days, but it was an electronic war even before the first shot. Tanks had FM radio before

Pearl Harbor, and that day itself seemed more disastrous because air warning radar was so close to effectiveness on the island of Oahu. That a whole family of radars was ready for the outbreak of war was a basic condition of the Army's whole strategic and tactical response. Mr. Terrett follows the Signal Corps radar from its first dim beginnings in the 1930's. Radar was not just one invention but many interrelated ones. And Mr. Terrett recognizes that as long as it was simply an electronic gadget its usefulness was limited. It required a widespread social reorganization which cut across not only the technical services and the traditional using arms such as the Coast Artillery, but also it involved the design of air power, the Navy, the British, and even the unintentional cooperation of the enemy. Until information centers, communication nets, gun control, and aircraft meshed coherently, the congeries of electronic components meant little.

In unfolding the Signal Corps contribution to radar Mr. Terrett has the difficult task of watching the larger developments in the Navy and abroad while at the same time he plays the advocate for the advances made by the Army partner. In describing the Tizard Mission from England Mr. Terrett recognizes specifically that "the impression arose, never thereafter to be dislodged, that Signal Corps equipment was insufficient, belated, lamely derivative, and unworthy of any place in the same league with British equipment." This canard he attacks in detail, eventually concluding that all in all, "Great Britain and the United States had followed separate routes to approximately equivalent spots. . . ." The alleged inferiority to British radar was one of the bases of the severe quarrel with the Army Air Corps which came to a climax in the summer of 1941. Mr. Terrett is calm about it, presenting both sides with crisp understatement, but the reader gets the impression that the Signal Corps was able to hold onto its domain only by the narrowest of margins.

The history of technology, including military technology, is in a more backward state than its subject matter. The canons of the art are not well defined, and any attempt at real analysis is often thoughtlessly dismissed as a mere mixture of technicalities. Mr. Terrett has made a real and successful effort, in the face of formidable nomenclatures and bewildering combinations of scientific disciplines, to assay the nature and impact of important technological developments in the

Signal Corps. Until the later volumes of the Signal Corps history appear, it is impossible to say that all the most important developments of the war in army communications and electronics occurred before Pearl Harbor, but this volume may ultimately prove to be an early climax of the series.

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Graf Spee. The Life and Death of a Raider.

By Dudley Pope (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1957. Pp. 256. Illustrated. \$3.95.)

In World War II the British appeared at their best in the smaller actions. Among the larger engagements even their victory at Cape Matapan is not very impressive upon analysis; their carriers were singularly ineffective throughout the war, and they alone lost a carrier to a surface vessel; the tremendous force necessary to dispose of the "Bismarck" is scarcely to the credit of the Admiralty, even when the difficulties of tracking down a raider are fully taken into account. But in minor destroyer or cruiser actions, in which seamanship and courage perhaps plays a more direct role, the British were at times superb. The victory of the heavy cruiser "Exeter" and the light cruisers "Ajax" and "Achilles" over the "Graf Spee" on December 13, 1939, is one of the best examples.

The Battle of the River Plate, the title under which Dudley Pope's book was published in England, is more apt than the American title, which seems to suggest that the book is a biography of the "Graf Spee." Actually there is little of the life of the "Spee" to be found in the book. There is no real explanation of Admiral Zenker's bold and original concept which made it possible to build an effective warship within limitations which seemed to dictate a slow coast-defense vessel, and there is only a minimal description of the "Spee" herself.

The historical background, covering the rebuilding of the German Navy and the approach of World War II, is the weakest portion of the book. Not only does the general picture fail to emerge, but there are some errors. The Anglo-German Naval Treaty of June 1939 is in three places attributed to 1936, and Mr. Pope says that in 1936 "British and Americans had their hands tied by treaties," without indicating that the treaties expired at the end of the year.

But the story of the "Graf Spee's" single wartime cruise and her final battle is told in detail and with excellent dramatic effect. And Mr. Pope's account incidentally clears up several points relating to the action. For example, he makes it clear that it was not a shortage of fuel which compelled the "Spee" to put into Montevideo, as has been alleged. The "Spee" had fueled from the "Altmarck" on December 6, just a week before the battle, and her capacity was such as to enable her to operate six weeks before refueling.

Mr. Pope quite correctly emphasizes the human or personal element in the battle, for in terms of physical equipment the Germans ought obviously to have won. But it is clear that the British vessels were fought very well, while the "Graf Spee" was badly handled. Even so, the Germans did succeed in mauling the "Exeter" severely and in forcing her out of action. Admiral Sir Edward Parry (Captain Parry of the "Achilles") says in the Foreword: "To this day I do not know why the *Admiral Graf Spee* did not dispose of us in the *Ajax* and the *Achilles* as soon as she had finished with the *Exeter*."

Admiral Parry raises other questions: "Why did the captain of the *Admiral Graf Spee* think that his ship was so seriously damaged that he must make for a neutral port instead of finishing off his two small opponents?" and "Why was he so easily persuaded that large British warships were waiting for him outside Montevideo, when in fact there was only one new arrival, far inferior in gunpower to his own ship?" Mr. Pope's answers, though far from satisfactory, are probably as complete as we shall ever have. But the questions do emphasize that in terms of damage inflicted the battle was far from a clear British victory. And while the British were pretending to use all diplomatic means to prevent the "Graf Spee" from remaining more than 72 hours in Montevideo, they were in fact desperately anxious lest she sail before the Royal Navy could get heavy ships to the scene.

The real British victory, then, was moral rather than physical, one of diplomatic bluff rather than of naval tactics. Coming as it did after the sinking of the "Royal Oak" in Scapa Flow and the loss of the gallant "Rawalpindi," it was the first British naval success of the war. Consequently it has received rather more attention than a cruiser action deserves when put in the perspective of the entire war.

In reporting this battle and the subsequent

events, Mr. Pope, who is naval correspondent of the London *Evening News*, has made what will probably be the definitive study. Serious students will regret the limited documentation, but the general reader will find it informative and exciting.

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The Administration of War Production—History of the Second World War (Civil Series. By J. D. Scott and Richard Hughes. (London: H. M. S. O.; New York: British Information Service, 1956. Pp. 556. \$6.75 post.)

This is a thorough, detailed, and philosophical coverage of how the British Government organized and administered the production effort of the United Kingdom for World War II.

The necessary historical background of the three services (Admiralty, War Office and Air Ministry) and the administrative organization for coordination between them up to 1939 are treated separately in the early chapters. Since organizations grow organically and not logically, this background provides a basis for an appreciation of the changes that were necessary as the war progressed. The story then picks up the Admiralty and carries it through the war years, returning in point of time, to treat with the formation and administration of the Ministry of Supply and the Ministry of Aircraft Production in that order. Lastly, it sets forth the problems of coordination between these two supply departments and the Admiralty and how these problems culminated in the formation of the Ministry of Production in February, 1942, and its subsequent administration throughout the war.

It is interesting to follow this trend in the British Administrative efforts from their traditional decentralized committee or board to the formation of the Ministry of Production under which, Mr. Bevin thought, the whole business of production and supply would be "gripped and controlled at the top by a small and competent body." Lord Beaverbrook, the first Minister of Production, described this organization as "an infant born in Moscow," "grew up in the United States."

It is noteworthy that the authors have been able to present a word description of the complicated and sometimes overlapping administrative organizations that were developed to handle the

complex production effort of the U.K. without the use of organizational charts so dear to the hearts of most U.S. writers on such subjects. In this case they have been appended almost as an afterthought.

As an overview, what stands out clearly in the mind of this reader is the proof of the truism that an organization derives its character from the person at its head rather than from any charts or charters that might have been laid down in advance of the appointment of the director.

For the U.S. reader, it is interesting to note the effect of our government organization and action on the British counterpart after 1941. It is a timely study for us in the light of the recurring pressures within our Congressional circles for "a Fourth Service of Supply," and of the difficulties, expressed and implied, that were encountered by the British when the control of research, design and procurement was not in the hands of the user service.

The book is interesting and informative to a student of governmental organization and administration of a national war economy. The British have often been accused by their critics, within and without Britain, of "muddling through" their crises, but in perspective, the whole administrative effort of mobilizing their production under extremely adverse conditions stands out as a magnificent job. The organization arrived at by the middle of 1943 was largely perfected and could have continued to operate without major changes for as long as necessary. The period of experimentation up to that point is reminiscent of the parade of alphabetical war agencies that Washington witnessed in the period of transformation from a peace to a war economy.

A. T. WRIGHT
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Faculty, ICAF
Washington, D.C.

Miracle of World War II. By Francis Walton. (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1956. Pp. 559. \$7.50.)

It would be difficult to find a more enthusiastic advocate of the ability of Industry to deliver prodigious amounts of military hardware under wartime conditions than Mr. Walton who discusses in great detail the many facets of the industrial economy during the second World War. Using the case history technique he runs the whole

gamut of problems faced and solved by management during the war.

One of the major difficulties facing industry was the problem of military contracting. Most business men were unfamiliar with government procedures and specifications. This lack of knowledge caused delays in starting production. At the beginning of the war there was no organization in government which could cut through the red tape of peacetime regulations and speed the letting of contracts. As bad as this problem was for the large business organizations with their legal staffs, it was especially stifling for the small business/men who were unaccustomed to government procedures. This problem was finally solved by the Smaller War Plants Corporation which helped the smaller firms obtain prime contracts and guided others into sub-contracting activities.

Probably the most frustrating condition at the start of the war was the fact that everyone wanted everything at once if not sooner. This difficulty had not been anticipated by the government planners and no adequate system or organization was in being to solve the problem. Steel was immediately in short supply and most of it was allocated to war production. However, before war production could begin, new plants had to be built, new tools had to be designed and constructed. All of these items required steel in large quantities. At the same time, shipping was being sunk faster than it could be built and ships also required steel. The priorities system for allocation of critical materials rapidly became a joke as super priority was piled on top of super priority. This problem was not solved until the steel industry was able to expand production to the point where it could meet the demands of the country for its product. Similar problems plagued the nation wherever shortages arose in materials for production.

The automotive industry achieved wonders in the production of implements of war. The ability of this industry to convert from the peacetime production of automobiles and trucks to the production of military components required by our fighting men was truly remarkable. It has been estimated that the automotive industry alone could have produced all of the weapons needed to win the war. This was truly the miracle of World War II.

Unfortunately, Mr. Walton has a tendency to play down the very real problems that faced the government and military planners in trying to

rearrange the industrial economy of this country. He adopts a rather sarcastic attitude toward military brass and government officials, implying that they were inept, hidebound, and more interested in retaining their vested interests than in solving production problems. Because he has ignored these very real difficulties, his book cannot be accepted as a definitive study of the problems of mobilization during war. It is filled with praise for the capabilities of business/men to do an outstanding job of production, but it sounds too much like the comment of a leading manufacturer of aircraft whose idea of mobilization planning was summed up in the words "Just give us a contract and let us alone." Unfortunately, the disruption of an entire nation's economy in war mobilization is not that simple.

JOHN BANDY
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Washington, D.C.

Northern Ireland in the Second World War.

By John W. Blake. (Belfast: H. M. Stationery Office [distrib. British Information Services, New York], 1956. Pp. xv, 569. \$5.60 post-paid.)

There is something for everyone in this one-volume summary of Northern Ireland's war effort in World War II—discussions of the historical background of the "Six Counties" of Ulster, the constitutional status of Northern Ireland and its place in the imperial strategy of Great Britain, the people and resources of the country and the ways in which these were marshalled for war, as well as operational accounts of the wartime activities of Ulstermen and women at home and abroad. Of perhaps the greatest immediate interest to American military scholars are the chapters dealing with the role played by Northern Ireland in winning the Battle of the Atlantic and the chapter recounting the history of American forces stationed in Northern Ireland. These two sections are excellent supplements to Morison's history of the Navy in World War II and the volumes of the Army's series concerned with the mounting of the offensive against the Continent.

Apart from these utilitarian considerations, this reviewer was greatly impressed with what the book stands for: a one-volume review of the totality of a nation's war effort. Much can be said for this kind of condensation which, in the present instance, should be wholly satisfactory to all but

the most detailed investigator. Granted, that the multi-volume war histories of the United States, Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, and so forth must needs be done in order to encompass all of the varied activities of those nations in so vast an undertaking as World War II. Yet the day will come when utility will require these to be boiled down into a narrative that can be contained within the covers of one book. When that millenium is reached, *Northern Ireland in the Second World War* will be at once an inspiration and a guidepost.

The writer of the small unit history can also learn much by way of example from Blake's chapters on the field operations of Northern Irish troops in Europe and Asia. Of necessity, the accounts are of small parts of a great whole. He has done an admirable job of keeping his eye on the tree without losing track of the forest, thereby avoiding the so common pitfall in which one regiment or one division becomes a whole war. At times when it was warranted, he has even been able to examine the leaves on the tree by describing outstanding exploits of individual officers and men.

Thus, apart from its factual content, *Northern Ireland in the Second World War* can be read with a good deal of pleasure and profit by anyone who is seriously interested in acquainting himself with exemplary models of military historiography. The Sinn Feiner, however, will be disappointed in the book if he is looking for a polemic against Eire with which to do battle. It speaks well for Blake's objectivity that, when the sad division of the country had to be touched upon, there was no trace of rancor or bitterness at a neutrality which distressed and alarmed all who wished for a common front against a common enemy.

If one fault must be found with the book, it is that the format and philosophy of the work has been copied from that of the British official histories of World War II. What we are given, then, is actually an official statement that we must accept at face value, since there is neither documentation nor bibliography by which to judge the depth and character of the research upon which the narrative is built. There is no reason to doubt the authenticity of the text, but it would be much better if we knew something about the sources.

The maps and tables are entirely satisfactory, and the book is a fine example of Irish printing which compares very favorably with that of Eng-

land and is much too seldom seen in this country.

MICHAEL O'QUINLIVAN
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Science in the Federal Government. By A. Hunter Dupree. (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957. Pp. 460. \$7.50.)

It is well amid the present multiplicity and pressure of scientific work in the government to examine the historical beginnings of these important activities. It is a revelation to look into the circumstances and conflicts which attended the establishment of scientific organizations such as the Smithsonian Institution and the National Academy of Sciences. There were more than a few misgivings at first whether the government under the Constitution should undertake science at all (the Constitution provided specifically only for the granting of patents). Yet the people at once began to demand of their leaders, whether state or federal, many services which the government alone could provide, services not profitable for private enterprise to undertake. Almost universally at first only applied science was involved, to meet practical needs entailing such technical skills as were required for mapping land, and, before that, for the exploration of it, for coast surveys to benefit shipping, for standards of weights and measures to benefit commerce, and so on. The needs grew as the nation grew, with amazing proliferation in more recent decades, as science developed from an individual concern to a team effort with whole government bureaus involved, advancing even further to the threshold of the present view that science and scientific research, even so-called pure or abstract research, constitute a vital national resource.

Mr. Dupree has accomplished a fine job of study and assessment in this hitherto almost untouched field. The book well meets the goal the author set for himself—to unfold the nation's policies and efforts in scientific works from the beginning to 1940 and to provide a rounded synthesis of the whole. That whole becomes, in the latter half of the book, an almost overwhelming aggregation of men and government organizations. The reader comes to feel that most government activities can be associated with science in one way or another, especially if the definition in-

cludes, as it does in this book, the social sciences and statistics.

The book holds much of interest to the military. Military needs and the contributions of science have long interacted. Their relationships, from the rather more friction than affection in earlier periods to the welcomed assistance of such recent institutions as the NACA (National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics), all receive the author's discerning attention. Time and again when the "practical" needs of business or commerce could not elicit money from a reluctant Congress, military needs did. Or it was simply convenient and economical to put personnel already on the military payroll at work in scientific endeavors. Many explorations were so accomplished, for example, Antarctic exploration by Wilkes with naval support and Arctic expeditions by the Army Signal Corps in the first International Polar Year (actually the first International Geophysical Year). Many scientific organizations began under military auspices, such as the Naval Observatory and the Weather Bureau, the latter of which took form in the Army under the Chief Signal Officer. The Signal Corps, often called the Signal Service, which Dupree unfortunately seeks to distinguish from the Corps, became so preoccupied with its weather service that some confused the two. The indexer of this book confused them to the extent that he wrongly associated the Signal Service itself with the Department of Agriculture, to which the weather function transferred in 1891. Another confusion in the index involves the important American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), for which there is no entry at all. Instead, the many page references to the AAAS are placed under quite another entry having the same initials, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

But these slight defects only point up the great complexity and wide scope of the subject. Altogether, the book fills a long standing need and is most timely in this era of tremendous government-science partnership and endeavor so pregnant with significance to every person living and to come.

GEORGE RAYNOR THOMPSON
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With Crook at the Rosebud. By J. W. Vaughn. (Harrisburg, Pa.: The Stackpole Company, 1956. Pp. 245. Notes, App., Bibliog., and Index. \$5.00.)

This is an account of the march of General George Crook's column north from Fort Fetterman (near present Douglas, Wyo.) against the hostile Sioux and Northern Cheyenne Indians in 1876, which culminated in the Battle of the Rosebud on the 17th of June. Containing 1325 men, this was the largest of three columns converging on the Indians whose exact location and strength were unknown.

It is strange that one phase of a campaign should be so prolific in literature while another, and possibly a more important one, should be so sterile. The Dustin bibliography on the Custer phase published in Graham's *Custer Myth* contains 641 items, while the one in this volume consists of about 45, although the latter is admittedly much more selective. This is the first volume other than by newspaper correspondents, of limited perspective, devoted exclusively to the march and battle. A rich source of data for this volume is provided by Lt. John G. Bourke's *With Crook on the Border*, together with his diary.

Crook's column started on the 29th of May. Everything seemed to go wrong and to cap the climax the wrong turn was taken which resulted in a wide detour and discovery by hostile hunters, eliminating the possibility of the surprise on which Crook counted and bringing on a minor engagement on the 9th of June.

The hostile Indians finally struck in force about mid-morning of the 17th, while Crook's command was in an extended rest period during its march down the Rosebud. An estimated 1500 to 2500 Indians under Crazy Horse came overnight from their village, some 17 miles north. The army scouts furnished only short notice but troops formed rapidly and secured strategic positions. Then occurred numerous isolated mounted charges which, in a very rough, rocky terrain, had no effect except to put some detachments in precarious positions from which it was difficult to extract them.

The Indian allies did splendid work, holding off the first attack and later even meeting the hostile Indians in a melee. They saved Captain Henry's life by a charge while the enemy were counting coup after Henry was shot from his horse. The packers and 65 miners who had attached themselves to the command took positions as sharpshooters and, being armed with modern, long-range rifles, equal to the best the enemy had, did excellent service. Without them and the Crow and Shoshone allies the troops would have had

difficulty in maintaining their position. In the late afternoon, with no definite results, the enemy withdrew, as was their custom when tired of fighting, without pursuit.

General Crook had a fine reputation as an Indian fighter, but unfortunately it had largely been earned against the Apaches where the problem was to corner small, active bands of raiders and not to meet large, mobile bodies in combat. He failed to estimate the situation properly and discounted the tactical skill of Crazy Horse and the strength and fighting ability of the hostile Indians. His losses were remarkably small but the records are surprisingly incomplete according to our author. Crook reported 9 killed but other estimates were higher. The actual figures were probably somewhat greater than Crook's. Even the highest figures did not justify his subsequent action. The Crow and Shoshone losses were very small. The enemy losses are unknown. Thirteen bodies were found on the field, but as usual the wounded and many of the dead were carried off by the Indians. A more reasonable estimate is 36 to 86 killed and 63 to 100 wounded.

Crook held the field but retreated the next day to his wagon train on Goose Creek, which may have been justified as a temporary measure, but instead of taking the field again he awaited reinforcements. In the meantime Custer was leading his men to the Little Big Horn and Gibbon was marching up the Big Horn for a junction on 26 June while Crook sat on his rump. As commander of one column in a tripartite pincer movement he was duty bound to move as soon as possible, regardless of conditions, and had he done so, the result on 25 June might have been very different.

This volume makes an interesting addition to the literature of the 1876 campaign and fully covers a phase that has been neglected. The notes are numerous and complete, but confined to the back of the volume where they are not conducive to ready reference. There are several good photographic reproductions, including one of Crazy Horse published for the first time, although there is some question of identification. Also there is a very interesting photo of some 50 different shell cases and a few unexploded cartridges collected by the author from the battlefield with identifications by Medicus. In the text are liberal quotations from various sources, with many digressions, which do not add to the continuity of the narrative.

There are no maps except a crude, incomplete cover map of the battle at front and rear with uncouth hachures. Admittedly, maps available in 1876 were sketchy, incomplete, and often incorrect, but now it would be easy to procure a correct modern one and trace movements of the army, hostile Indians, and Indian allies, which would greatly add to the ease and pleasure of reading the volume.

The typography is excellent, as is customary with the publisher, and the appendices contain the muster rolls of the troops engaged and the various official reports.

HENRY S. MERRICK
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As They Saw Forrest. Edited by Robert Selph Henry. (Jackson, Tenn.: McCowat-Mercer Press, Inc., 1956. Pp. xvi, 306. 2 maps and 31 photographs. \$5.00) No. 3 of a Series of Monographs, Sources, and Reprints in Southern History, Bell Irvin Wiley, Editor.

This volume is a collection of comments on and recollections of Lt. Gen. Nathan Bedford Forrest, C.S.A., by contemporaries including men who rode with him, opponents, bystanders, a foreign commentator (General Viscount Wolseley), and Forrest himself.

Colonel Henry, the author of an outstanding biography of Forrest, has carefully selected these factual, informative, and colorful excerpts. His knowledge of material on Forrest speaks for their reliability. His editing is unobtrusive and has consisted primarily of selection rather than interpretation. Six pages of index and two maps, prepared by Monroe F. Cockrell and Andrew Brown, are valuable aids to the student. Mr. Cockrell's map traces the routes of Forrest's military campaigns while Mr. Brown's details Sturgis' march to Brice's Cross Roads.

This volume is a valuable addition to the Confederate literature being printed today, bringing together much relatively scarce material. It is recommended for both the casual reader and the student of the military career and exploits of Nathan Bedford Forrest.

RALPH W. DONNELLY
Member
Civil War Round Table
of Washington, D. C.

So Full A Glory: A Biography of Marshal de Lattre de Tassigny. By Major-General Sir Guy Salisbury-Jones. (New York, Praeger, 1955. Pp. 288. \$5.00.)

In *So Full A Glory* Major-General Sir Guy Salisbury-Jones, the British Military Attaché in Paris after the recent war, gives a gingerly treatment to the life and career of his friend, the marshal. Lattre de Tassigny was a difficult character if ever there was one. Famed for his ability to sustain towering rages for as long as three days, he could magnify the importance of a missing light bulb in a camp wash house or a sour note from a tuba in a military band into at least a national incident, for it somehow reflected discredit upon the glory which was France's.

These foibles are honestly revealed by the marshal's British biographer who is nonetheless unstinting in his praise and admiration of so dashing a figure. Born February 2, 1889, in the home town of Clemenceau, Mouilleron-en-Pareds, in the heart of royalist Vendée, de Lattre, in contrast to the Tiger, was steeped in the traditions of his milieu: ardent clericalism, monarchism, a belief in the virtues and obligations of the aristocracy, and an attitude of un-intellectualism if not outright anti-intellectualism.

In the Blitzkrieg of 1940, de Lattre's 14th Infantry Division fought hard but as ineffectually as the rest of the French army. When the Allies landed in North Africa in November of 1942, he tried to coordinate an uprising in their support from his headquarters of the XVI "Military Division" at Montpellier. The Germans frustrated the comic-opera plot and imprisoned him at Riom. His escape and flight to England were arranged in October of 1942. De Lattre served with the Gaullist forces for the remainder of the war, capturing Elba, Toulon, Marseilles and Strasbourg. His pride and wrath proved an affliction for General Devers, Commander of the 6th Army Group of which the First French Army was a part. At the end de Lattre established his headquarters in the histrionic setting of Lindau, on the shores of beautiful Lake Constance. His spectacular parades of Spahis were cut short by his temporary retirement.

De Lattre was appointed to the post of Inspector-General of the French army, and soon thereafter French representative on the Chiefs of Staff, Brussels Treaty Defense Organization. De Lattre and Marshal Montgomery made heroic efforts to

get along with one another. The war in Indo-China brought his nomination as High Commissioner and Commander-in-Chief in that forbidding struggle. All of de Lattre's panache, personal bravery, and his endless tirades over his troops' peccadillos could not save a lost war. He died of cancer in January 1952, and was posthumously awarded a marshal's baton.

General Salisbury-Jones approaches his subject with long teeth. But this is a frank appraisal, full of warm eulogy as well as damaging admissions. Its style, unhappily, has a schoolmarmish sedateness which is strangely out of keeping with the theatrical subject. The author consulted the marshal's wife, father, and sister for information, which he supplemented by reference to a score of books.

JERE C. KING
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Truxtun of the Constellation. By Eugene S. Ferguson. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1956. Pp. xii, 322. Illus. Maps. Index. \$5.25.)

This is the first book about Truxtun and it should be the last, because it is so good. Seven pages of fine print bibliography and thirty-eight pages of documentation, all reflect the enormous task of research by the author.

Truxtun, born in 1755, was of tremendous importance in the professionalization of our naval officer corps. During his short service period from 1794 to 1802, he left his mark on the Navy, leaving it for a matter of sound professional principle when he was in the full prime of life. He is best remembered for his capture of *l'Insurgente* and his clash with *La Vengeance*, during our Quasi-War with France. He should however, be better remembered as a squadron commander who guided his officers and subordinate captains into sturdy adaptation of British regulations and practices. He turned the Navy away from that privateering predilection which was our maritime equivalent of the frontier spirit, and made naval-officering a real career.

R. W. DALY
U.S. Naval Academy

The Civil War (Vol. I, The American Iliad as Told by Those Who Lived It. Introduction by Bruce Catton, Vol. II, The Picture Chronicle of the Events, Leaders

and Battlefields of the War. Introduction by Allan Nevins). Vol. I by Otto Eisenschiml and Ralph Newman; Vol. II by Ralph Newman and E. B. Long. (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1956. Vol. I, Pp. 719, Vol. II, Pp. 240, \$12.50.)

In its tragic grandeur, the epic story of our Civil War deserves the title of the American Iliad. Like the Iliad, the tale has drama and movement which the first volume of this unique survey of the Civil War successfully captures. But Homer wrote for an aristocratic society. Only the character and the deeds of the leaders interested him and his audience. Whoever heard any comments from the Myrmidons about Achilles?

The approach of each of our two Civil War specialists, Eisenschiml and Newman, is entirely different. The battles of the Civil War, the marches and the camps, the maneuvers and the life of the soldiers are described by eye-witness participants in their own words. The point of view shifts from the commanding general to the soldier enduring his baptism of fire, from a regimental or battalion or company commander to the surgeon in a field hospital. Each side of the battle line is given a hearing. The continuity of the story is marvelously maintained by succinct commentary from the compilers of these skillfully chosen bits and pieces. As Mr. Bruce Catton puts it in his introduction to Vol. I: "To read this account is to gain a new feeling of the depth and power of America's greatest emotional experience."

Civil War photographs in great number supplement the words of the observers. Volume II also contains a concise month-by-month chronicle of the major events of the War, illuminating biographical sketches with portraits of a hundred principal military leaders of the North and South, and a useful record of the large military units. The authors also suggest a bibliography of books for a personal Civil War library. This reviewer highly recommends these two volumes as useful if not indispensable additions to such a collection.

DONALD ARMSTRONG
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Washington, D.C.

An Intimate Journal of the Dreyfus Case. By Maurice Paléologue. (New York: Criterion Books, 1957. Pp. 309. \$4.50.)

How seriously is one to take a posthumously published diary which treats a highly controversial affair when the author admits at the outset that

he destroyed the original manuscript after making "literary" revisions? This question is posed for the reader of the journal of the Dreyfus affair written by the French diplomat and dilettante, Maurice Paléologue. One does not proceed far into this book before being convinced that it contains much artful hocus pocus. Yet the work is not without merit and even profit for the reader who is interested in the greatest peace-time crisis which the French army had to face within the last century.

Paléologue's shallowness is revealed by his glib and pointless name dropping, and his flighty imagination is displayed by his cock-and-bull hypothesis that in the Dreyfus affair there were no less than three traitors. The first was the proven spy, the colorful scoundrel of Hungarian extraction, Major Esterhazy; the second was an intimate of General Saussier, the French Commander-in-chief, one Maurice Weil, who procured his own wife for the general; and the third was an unnamed traitor, described by Paléologue in 1899 as an "officer of very high rank who, after holding important office in the War Ministry for several years, is now in command of troops." Characteristically, Paléologue never furnishes even a hint as to the identity of his third "traitor."

If the book adds nothing to the verifiable knowledge of the Dreyfus affair itself, it at least throws light on that murky social psychosis, anti-Semitism, with which the French army command was so disastrously tainted half a century ago. This diseased outlook is fully shared by Paléologue, despite his efforts to qualify his judgments. The farthest that Paléologue goes in establishing his objectivity is to concede that the Jewish captain, Alfred Dreyfus, was innocent of the charge of spying for Germany. But most of the French higher command would not even go that far, holding obstinately to the view that defending the army's "honor" was a more sacred obligation than defending honesty and justice.

JERE CLEMENS KING
University of California, Los Angeles

The King's African Rifles. By Lt. Colonel H. Moyse-Bartlett. (Aldershot: Gale & Polden, Ltd., 1956. Pp. 727. Index and Glossary. 30 S.)

The King's African Rifles is one of those books which not only fulfills the purpose for which it was written but goes far beyond the intentions of the author. Col. Moyse-Bartlett may not have intended to produce a history of British Colonial

policy in Africa but his book will gain greater fame in this field than as a purely military work.

As a volume of military history *The King's African Rifles*, is excellent, factual, and authoritative. Its author has captured the art of taking the detailed and often dull accounts of military action and portraying them in a manner certain to gain reader attention. However, as an exposé of Britain's policies, administration, and operational methods in colonial areas this book has no peer in current times.

This valuable contribution in a world fighting colonialism should be in every library and in the hands of every scholar interested in world problems.

JOHN E. KIEFFER
Washington, D. C.

Decisive Battles of the Civil War. By Lt. Col. Joseph B. Mitchell (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1955. Pp. 256. \$4.00)

SHORTER REVIEWS

The following books are among those received for review by MILITARY AFFAIRS. Space has not allowed a more detailed discussion of their value to our readers. The cooperation of their publishers is called to the attention of all members.

Non-fiction

American Assembly; The United States and the Far East. (New York: Columbia University, Graduate School of Business, 1956. Pp. 229. Apply.)

This tenth assembly final edition includes the papers and final report of the session held in November 1956 at Arden House. It covers the relations of the United States and Japan, Korea, Communist China and Taiwan.

BACLAGON, ULDARICO, S: *Phillipine Campaigns* Foreword by Ramon Magsaysay, Secretary of Defense. Introduction by Major General Calixlo Duque, AFP, Chief Staff. (Manila: Graphic House, 1952.) Pp. 388. (Washington: Army Book Service, \$4.50)

The first detailed military historical account of the Philippines by a former instructor of History of Military Art and now Head, Department of Social Sciences, Philippine Military Academy is now available for U. S. distribution. Lt. Col. Baclagon has described the entire historical period

Col. Joseph Mitchell has presented in chronological order a brief account of the battles of the Civil War. The author has based his account on standard works of the Civil War period and National Park Service folders. No new evidence or interpretations are presented.

The volume is primarily a guidebook to the battlefields. The battlefield maps presented in two colors are the outstanding feature of the book and should prove helpful to the traveler. Many historians will quibble with the author as to whether most of the battles described were as decisive as the title of the book implies.

While this book will have limited value for the student of the Civil War, it will be useful for the visitor to the battlefields who wants a concise account of what happened and where on the ground these events occurred.

HERBERT E. KAHLER
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National Park Service
Washington, D. C.

from the campaigns occurring during the Spanish regime to the Liberation of the Philippines in World War II.

BANNING, KENDALL and AZOY, A.C.M.: *West Point Today*. (New York: Coward-McCann, 1957. Pp. 256. \$3.95.)

This book, written by the late Lt. Col. Kendall Banning (USMA 1939) and revised and edited by Col. A. C. M. Azoy, contains a wealth of information, factual, historical, practical and useful. It is especially valuable for its detailed listing of the paintings, monuments, and historical objects to be found in the Military Academy Library, the West Point Museum, the Cadet Chapel, the Academy grounds and the West Point Cemetery. Packed with information on the customs of the Corps of Cadets, etc., it is an excellent guide book, having but few minor errors.

W.C.F.

BARDENS, DENNIS: *Portrait of a Statesman*. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956. Pp. 326. \$6.00.)

A diplomatic history of the times as well as a popular biography of Anthony Eden ending with his becoming Prime Minister in April 1955. Undocumented, the volume contains a bibliography and index.

CAMPBELL, ARTHUR: *The Siege*, a story from Kohina. (London: Allen and Unwin), 1956. New York: Macmillan, 1956. Pp. 211. \$3.00.)

An account of the sixteen day siege of Kohina in India, in April 1944 when 500 men of the 4th Battalion, Royal West Kent Regiment, successfully withstood 15,000 men of the 31st Japanese Division. This is a stirring description, including photographs and maps of one of the great World War II sieges involving the British Army. In this case a territorial unit halted the invasion of India. Recommended.

DONALD, DAVID: *Lincoln Reconsidered*, essays on the Civil War era. (New York: Knopf, 1956. Pp. 200. \$3.00.)

"Refighting the Civil War," chapter V, and its bibliographic essay are most important for the military historian of the Civil War to read since they discuss the influence of strategic writers as Jomini upon the concepts of strategy to be applied by the high commanders.

HESS, DEAN E., Col., USAF, *Battle Hymn*. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1956. Pp. 246. \$3.95)

The story of the protestant minister who flew 300 combat missions in World War II and Korea, developed the Korean Air Force, organized the saving of Korean orphans through *Operation "Kiddy Car"* and their permanent home on Chojun Island. It is the basis for the current movie about his activities.

How to Get Ahead in the Air Force, 1st ed. (Harrisburg Military Service Publishing Company, 1957, Pp. 203. \$2.00.)

A basic book of advice for the ambitious airman.

MASTON, J. B.: *Christianity and World Issues* (New York: Macmillan, 1957. Pp. 374. \$5.00.)

In this documented study by the Professor of Christian Ethics at Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, Chapters I "War and Peace"; X "War and The Christian Conscience"; VI and VII "Communism" are most pertinent. Bibliographies give additional references.

PAWLE, GERALD: *The Secret War, 1939-45*. (New York: William Sloane Associates, 1957. Pp. 291. \$5.00.)

Sir Winston Churchill wrote one of his more apt phrases when he referred to the ceaseless struggle for mastery between Allied and enemy scientists as the Wizard War. The men who fought

the Wizard War were a fantastic collection of scientists, lawyers, novelists, beachcombers, journalists, truck drivers, and the like; and their products were even more fantastic. One group which produced more than its share of ingenious weapons was the Directorate of Miscellaneous Weapon Development of the Royal Navy. Mr. Pawle has written a fascinating history of the successes and failures of the "Wheezers" and "Dodgers" of D. M. W. D. Their work ran from plastic armor for ships to floating bridges and from a rocket which would carry a steel cable 500-feet up into the air to the "Great Panjandrum," a rocket powered vehicle for breaching the Atlantic Wall. *The Secret War* tells the story of the "Wheezers" and "Dodgers" with a deft touch which makes for pleasant reading.

K.J.B.

Royal Institute of International Affairs: on Limiting Atomic War. (New York, London, 1956. \$5.00.)

A report based upon the discussions of a study group in the summer of 1956 regarding the drawing of distinctions between the strategic and tactical use of such weapons resulting in a case for graduated deterrents. A provocative study.

VAGTS, ALFRED: *Defense and Diplomacy*; the soldier and the conduct of foreign relations. (New York: Kings Crown Press, 1956. Pp. 547. \$7.50.)

This tremendous Institute of War and Peace Studies sponsored volume is primarily concerned with events of the Nineteenth Century. Thoroughly documented by the author of *A History of Militarism*, its scope can be seen in the range of the topics covered: Soldiers and Diplomats; Soldiers in Diplomatic Posts; Diplomacy, Military Intelligence and Espionage, Foreign Offices and General Staffs; Military Conventions and General Staff Conversation, Military Missions and Instructors, Armed Demonstrations, Preventive War, The Promise of Victory, Mobilization and Diplomacy, General Staffs and Foreign Offices in time of War; Strategy and Diplomacy, Generals and Peace Making and Organization for Unity. It is a MUST for any military historian.

Fiction

COLE, BURT: *Subi: the Volcano*. (New York: Macmillan, 1957. Pp. 220. \$3.75.)

World War III in the Orient is the subject of this imaginative story as seen by a fortyish major of intelligence within and without the military

area next to a large city of starving natives. Provocative.

EIKEN, KARL V.: *Star of Macedon*. (New York: Putnam, 1957. Pp. 376. \$4.50.)

An enjoyable story of the wars of Alexander the Great, as seen by Gyges, one of his close associates. Well worth reading for recreation.

FULLER, IOLA: *The Gilded Torch*. (New York: Putnam, 1957. Pp. 343. \$4.00.)

LaSalle's expedition to explore the Great Lakes and Mississippi is intertwined with the lives of two noble brothers who leave the Court of Louis XV to endure the frontier's hardships. A substantive historical novel that maintains the high standards of the author's earlier works. Recommended.

HASSELL, SVEN, Pseud.: *Legion of the Damned*. Trans. from the Danish by Maurice Michael. (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Cudahy, 1957. Pp. 277. \$3.75.)

A readable documentary novel of the brutal experiences of the author in a German penal regiment primarily on the Russian front.

LEARY, FRANCIS: *Fire and the Morning*. (New York: Putnam, 1957. Pp. 297. \$3.95.)

An ably, sometimes overwritten, study with psychological overtones, of the life of Richard III in the year 1485, ending with his death after the battle of Bosworth Field. For the discerning reader, it will be most stimulating.

LINNA, VAINO: *The Unknown Soldier*. Trans. from the Finnish. (New York: Putnam, 1957, Pp. 316. \$4.00.)

A controversial best seller in Finland and in Europe, it tells of the winter war with Germany against Russia in terms of continual unrelieved suffering and death on the level of an infantry battalion.

OPITZ, KARLLUDWIG: *The General*. Trans. from the German by Constantine Fitzgibbon. (New York: John Day, 1957, Pp. 189. \$3.00)

An anti-militaristic satire, at times biting, of the war and postwar activities of a German division commander and his daughter as seen by his orderly-driver.

SCNEIDER, VERNE: *A Long Way From Home*. (New York: Putnam, 1956. Pp. 256. \$3.50.)

Eight short stories, some which relate to military life, by the author of "The Teahouse of the August Moon," which do not match its quality.

WYCOFF, NICHOLAS E.: *The Braintree Mission*, a fictional narrative of London and Boston, 1770-1771. (New York: Macmillan, 1957, Pp. 184, \$3.50.)

An engaging story describing the attempt to offer John Adams, defender of the Boston Massacre Redcoats, an earldom and seat in the House of Lords. Of value for those interested in a good story as well as in the political aspects of history.

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HEADQUARTERS GAZETTE

JOINT SESSION OF AMI AND AHA

The next joint session of the American Military Institute and the American Historical Association is scheduled for Dec. 28, 1957, 10 a.m., in the Statler Hotel, New York City. The title of the session is "The President as Commander-in-Chief: Coalition Warfare in the Twentieth Century." Dr. Ernest May of Harvard will read a paper on President Wilson as Commander-in-Chief in World War I, and Dr. William Emerson of Yale will read a paper on President Roosevelt as Commander-in-Chief in World War II. Walter Millis and Dr. Maurice Matloff will act as critics. Dr. James Phinney Baxter will be chairman of the meeting, but in the event he is not able to be present, Colonel T. N. Dupuy, GS, USA, the President of the American Military Institute and the organizer of the meeting, will take the chair in place of Dr. Baxter. For this important and interesting session a very good attendance is expected.

CIVIL WAR CENTENNIAL ACT

The 85th Congress, at the close of its first session, passed an act establishing the Civil War Centennial Commission. The Commission is to be composed of 25 members. The Senate and the House will each appoint four members; twelve members will be appointed by the President who is himself a member; as also are the President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House; and the Department of the Interior and the Library of Congress will each appoint one member.

The purpose of the Commission is to plan and execute a program for the proper observance of the centennial of the great Ameri-

can War of 1861-65, which still exercises a remarkable fascination for many Americans, partly as an imperishable saga, partly as great national folklore, and partly as "The Birth of a Nation." In addition it is replete with wonderful dramatic unities.

The Centennial Committee of the Civil War Round Table of the District of Columbia was instrumental in getting the cooperation of other Round Tables and groups in obtaining the best possible sponsorship for the bill in Congress. Karl S. Betts, Chairman of the CWRT Centennial Committee, in their *News Letter* of 10 September 1957, pays particular tribute to the efforts of Congressman William M. Tuck of Virginia, V. C. (Pat) Jones, William Ingles, Major General U. S. Grant, 3rd, Colonel Robert S. Henry, and Colonel J. Gay Seabourne.

ARMY ISSUES ARCHIVAL AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION GLOSSARY

The editor was gratified to receive recently one of those rare tool volumes so useful for a subject field. The Departmental Records Branch of The Adjutant General's Office of the United States Army has just issued a *Glossary of Archival and Records Administration Terms Applicable to the Work of the Departmental Records Branch*. A cursory examination shows that this 495 page mimeographed volume is applicable far beyond the immediate interests of the issuing office. Under the general direction of the Chief of the Branch, Sherrod East, this weighty work was compiled by Ken Munden, the Assistant Branch Chief. A formal review of this volume, which constitutes the tenth item in the Branch's series of Standing Operating Procedures, is now in process.

MILITARY HISTORY COURSE AT OHIO STATE

Colonel T. N. Dupuy, president of the American Military Institute, directed the second course of the Army ROTC instructors' course for the teaching of military history, at Ohio State University, the last two weeks in August 1957. Colonel Dupuy was also director of the first course given in August 1956. The mission of the course is "to give the senior division ROTC instructors a background in American military history, to motivate within them a desire to create interest and enthusiasm in the subject of American military history, to acquaint them with the techniques of teaching American military history, and familiarize them with additional reference material and training aids."

The Ohio State University is able to offer this special intensive course in American military history, through the use of funds bequeathed by the late Colonel Ralph D. Mershon, for the purpose of encouraging study in military fields. In view of the success of the 1956 course in preparing Army ROTC instructors, and in arousing their enthusiasm in the subject, the Continental Army Command requested The Ohio State University to repeat the course in 1957. A total of 80 students were enrolled in 1956, and 135 were enrolled in 1957. In addition to Colonel Dupuy, members of the staff and faculty included: Dr. Harry L. Coles and Dr. Morton Borden of Ohio State; Dr. Richard Challener, Assistant Professor of History at Princeton University; Dr. William Emerson, Assistant Professor of History at Yale University; Dr. Warren H. Hassler, Pennsylvania State University; Dr. Samuel P. Huntington, Harvard University; and Dr. Louis Morton, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army. Military members of the faculty included Lt. Colonel Joseph E. Pizzi, Major Ronan C. Grady, Major Rex. D. Minckler, Major

H. P. Kutchinski, and Captain R. J. Arnold, all of the United States Army.

WASHINGTON CWRT PROGRAM FOR 1957-58

Rex Magee, editor of the interesting *News Letter* of the District of Columbia Round Table reports the following lecture program for the 1957-58 season:

September 24—The Siege of Petersburg, by Richard W. Lykes

September 28 — Field Tour of Petersburg Battlefield

October 15—The First Cold War, by Avery Craven

November 12—The Gallant Mrs. Stonewall, by Harnett T. Kane

December 10—Union Chaplains in Combat, by Robert S. Hall.

January 14—George B. McClellan: A Re-evaluation, by Warren W. Hassler, Jr.

February 11 — The Confederate Navy and the Beginning of Modern Naval Warfare, by Rear Admiral E. M. Eller

March 11—The Kilpatrick-Dahlgren Raid, by V. C. (Pat) Jones

April 8—Annual Gold Medal Award Dinner

May 13—Brandy Station: Prelude to an invasion, by J. Gay Seabourne

May 24 — Field Tour of Brandy Station Battlefield

Readers of *Military Affairs* will recall that of the foregoing list of distinguished lecturers, Richard Lykes and Pat Jones are recent contributors: Lyke's article on "Hampton's Cattle Raid 1864," and Pat Jones' on "The Problem of Writing About the Guerrillas," both appeared in the Spring 1957 issue of *Military Affairs* (Vol. XXI, No. 1).

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INFORMATION FOR AUTHORS

Type manuscripts on one side of 8½ x 11 inch bond paper. Leave ample margins and double-space throughout, *including* footnotes and quotations to be set in reduced type. Footnotes should be double-spaced on sheets separate from the text and placed after the last page of the article. In matters of style and footnote citations the latest edition of Kate L. Turabian, *A Manual for Writers . . .* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press) is to be followed. For points not covered adequately therein the latest edition of *A Manual of Style* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press) should be consulted.

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